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The Question of Union Activity
on Company Property
William B. Gould*
Mr. Gould here undertakes a study of the legal problems of union
activity on company property with regard to union solicitation of membership and distribution of union literature. After a study of several
recent cases the author expresses his dissatisfaction with the rationale
advanced in many of the cases and the failure of the tribunals to
appreciate the realities of industrial relations.

Trade unionism is not an accepted principle in this country today.
Of course, this fact, in deep contrast to most industrially advanced
Western nations, is partially explicable in terms of heavy investment
taking place in many hitherto rural areas. It is further attributableonce again only in part-to the quite often accurate characterization
of "big labor" as a wielder of powers, sometimes arbitrary, in a
manner reminiscent of the swashbuckling entrepreneurs against whom
the unions reacted. On the other hand, collective bargaining is an
almost venerable institution in many basic industries. The National
Labor Relations Act maintains an encouragement of its "practice and
procedure" as a basic policy of the United States.1 Yet there is a
pronounced disparity in atmosphere between many established collective bargaining relationships and industries or regions which are
nominally unionized or unorganized.2
Since Congress has chosen to proscribe a good deal of picketing
of an organizational and recognitional nature in the Landrum-Griffin
amendments to the act3 it is quite likely that the grounds for union* Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, 1963-; Assistant General Counsel, International Union, UAW, AFL-CIO, 1961-62; Member, Michigan Bar; A.B., University
of Rhode Island, 1958; LL.B., Cornell Law School, 1961; graduate study, London
School of Economics, 1962-63.
The viewpoints expressed by the author in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the National Labor Relations Board or any of its Members.
1. 49 Stat. 449, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1958): "It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions
to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the
purposes of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual
aid or protection."
2. See Could, Taft-Hartley Revisited. The Contrariety of the Collective Bargaining
Agreement and the Plight of the Unorganized, 13 LAoa L.J. 348 (1962).
3. 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b)(7) (Supp: I, 1959): "It shall be an unfair
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management combat will shift in this area somewhat to less specifically
regulated and, more important, protected organizational techniques.
Already this is a process that seems to be in motion insofar as union
activity on company property is concerned. A great majority of such
union campaigns are primarily if not solely aimed at obtaining the
worker's allegiance. Thus, for the most part, this approach is free
of the objections to picketing posed by Congress and the Supreme
Court 4-the pressure or "coercion" brought to bear upon the employer
through the public and outside non-employees as a result of conduct
which bears no legitimate relationship to real campaigning to persuade
the employees who have the choice of joining a union. It was the
judgment of Congress that instances of such coercion suffered by
the employer and the potential deprivation of employee opportunity
to select representatives of their own choosing because of a bargain
made over their heads should be prohibited by the act.5 But union
solicitation and distribution of literature to employees on company
premises would seem to fit more easily into a category of "persuasion"
rather than "coercion."6
labor practice for a labor organization or its agents .. .7) to picket or cause to be
picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an
object thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a
labor organization as the representative of his employees, or forcing or requiring
the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization as their
collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified
as the representative of suchemployees where such picketing has been conducted
without a petition under Section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period not to
exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, that when
such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith without regard to the provisions of Section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on
the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board finds
to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing
in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity
for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including consumers) that an
employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with, a labor organization,
unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other
person in the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver, transport any goods
or not to perform any services."
4. See especially the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Bakery & Pastry
Driver's Union v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Cf. Cafeteria Employees v. Angelos, 320
U.S. 293 (1943); AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310
U.S. 88 (1940); see also International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Newell, 356 U.S.
341 (1958); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Carpenter & Joiners Union v.'
Bitter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Milk Wagon Driver's Union v. Meadowmore
Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941). Newell and the Court's recent holding in Local 760,
NLRB v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58 (1964),
upholding consumer picketing at a secondary situs in the face of an apparently strong
congressional prohibition, mark out a possible renaissance of the Thornhill doctrine's
protection of picketing as free speech.
5. See Cox, LAw AND THP NATIONAL LABOR POLicy 20-47 (1960).
6. Distinctions between picketing and solicitation are, however, sometimes dificult
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Indeed, for a number of years the National Labor Relations Board
and the courts have promulgated rules-frequently confusing, ambiguous, and, according to the thesis of this article, without a proper
appreciation for logic or realistic analysis of industrial relationswithin the broad scope accorded by Congress under the National
Labor Relations Act. The pace is now a quickening one. It heralds
an ever growing need for proper analysis and understanding of the
realities confronting the parties in what is, more often than not, a
hard struggle for some of the wage earners' loyalties.
In Republic Aviation v. NLRB,7 the Supreme Court set forth the
ground rules concerning union activity on company property. To
this day they would appear (the operative word being appear) to
remain the basis of adjudication. This case presented the Court with
the question of whether the right of employees to pass out union
"authorization" cards during non-working time; to pass out union
literature in the parking lot and to wear union insignia at any time
was a protected one under section 7 of the act.8 Moreover, the
Court was asked to uphold the Board's presumption that employer
prohibition of such activity was violative of section 8(a) (1) without
the discriminatory motive that this provision normally requires for the
finding of an unfair labor practice. 9 Mr. Justice Reed, writing for
the Court, held this to be a protected activity and ratified the Board's
principle that impingement of such rights could be rationalized only
by an employer's legitimate business interest in production and
discipline. 10 Normally this defense was to be limited to working time
to draw. Cf. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency Inc., 136 N.L.R.B. 431 (1962).
7. 324 U.S. 793 (1945), consolidating Le Toumeau v. NLB.B, 143 F.2d 67 (5th

Cir. 1944).
8. 49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958): "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities . . . except
to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment authorized in Section 8(a)(3)."
9. 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (Supp. I, 1959): "It shall be an unfair labor
practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7."
10. In accordance with this principle it has been held that a non-solicitation rule
or prohibition drawn so broadly as to encompass non-working time is presumptively
unlawful. Cf. NLRB v. Linda Jo Shoe Co., 307 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1962); Olin Indus.
Inc. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1951); NLRB v. Illinois Tool Works, 153 F.2d
811 (7th Cir. 1946); NLRB v. Edinburg Citrus Ass'n, 147 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1945);
Carter Carburetor Corp. v. NLRB, 140 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1944); NLRB v. Denver
Tent & Awning, 138 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1943); Remington Rand Corp., 141 N.L.R.B.
1052 (1963); Walton Mfg. Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960); I. F. Sales Co., 82 N.L.R.B.
137 (1949), aff'd per curiam, 188 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1951). Accord, NLRB v. Thompson Ramo Woolridge, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Essex Wire Corp. 245
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although special exceptions to the presumption, 1 retail department

stores was to become one,'12 were permitted.

F.2d 589 (9th Cir. 1957); Aluminum Extrusions, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 57
1219 (1964); Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc. 149 NLRB No. 80, 57 L.R.R.M.
1385 (1964); Parker Seal Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 73, 57 L.R.R.M. 1429 (1964);
R.E.D.M. Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 98, 57 L.R.R.M. 1463, (1964); Mallory Plastics
L.R.R.M. 1219 (1964); Gotham Shoe Mfg. Co., Inc. 149 N.L.R.B. No. 80, 57 L.R.R.M.
Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 138, 58 L.R.R.M. 1014 (1964); Higgins Indus., 150 N.L.R.B.
No. 25, 58 L.R.R.M. 1059 (1964); Kern's Bakery, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 87, (1965);
Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 57 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1964); Welsh Co.,
149 N.L.R.B. No. 37, 57 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1964); Aerodex Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 25,
57 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1964); Bannon Mills, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 81, 55 L.R.R.M. 1370
(1964); Certain Teed Prod. Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 160, 56 L.R.R.M. 1431 (1964);
Ertel Mfg. Corp., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 39, 56 L.R.R.M. 1197 (1964); Firestone Steel
Prod. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 56 L.R.R.M. 1283 (1964); Hunt Electronics, 146
N.L.R.B. No. 155, 56 L.R.R.M. 1092 (1964); Lau Blower Co., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 146,
56 L.R.R.M. 1087 (1964); Park Edge Sheridan Meats Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 32, 55
L.R.R.M. 1296 (1964); Ben Dictator Co., 143 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 53 L.R.R.M. 1472,
(1963); Reeves Broadcast & Dev. Corp. (WHTN-TV), 140 N.L.R.B. 466 (1963);
Elias Bros. Big Boy Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1962), modified, 325 F.2d 360 (6th
Cir. 1963); General Indus. Electronics, 138 N.L.R.B. 1371 (1962); Idaho Potato
Processors, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 910 (1962), aff'd, 322 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1963);
Plant City Steel Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 839 (1962), aff'd, 331 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1964);
Adrian Steel Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 847 (1961); Altamount Shirt Corp., 131 N.L.R.B.
112 (1961); Becker-Durham Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1356 (1961); Rollash Corp., 133
N.L.R.B. 464 (1961); Texas Aluminum Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 443 (1961), aff'd, 300 F.2d
315 (5th Cir. 1962); Arrow Press, 122 N.L.R.B. 890, reversed, 272 F.2d 112 (7th
Cir. 1959); Jackson Tile Mfg. Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 764 (1958); J. E. Hamilton & Sons
Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 1468 (1958); Miller Elec. Mfg. Co. Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 298 (1958);
Pacemaker Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 987 (1958); Armstrong Tire & Rubber Co., 119
N.L.R.B. 382 (1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1959); Limestone Mfg. Co., 117
N.L.R.B. 1689 (1957).
Where an amicable relationship indicates that the rule's breadth arises out
of a mistake, a remedial order need not issue. General Dynamics, 145 N.L.R.B.
No. 81, 55 L.R.R.M. 1041 (1963); Compare Solo Cup Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 153,
54 L.R.R.M. 1293 (1963); W. Ralston & Co., Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 912 (1961),
aff'd per curiam, 298 F.2d 927 (2d Cir. 1962).
11. In the landmark decision of Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44
(1943), aff'd, 142 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 730 (1944), the
Board set forth the governing principles of law: "The Act, of course, does not
prevent an employer from making and enforcing reasonable rules covering the conduct
of employees on company time. Working time is for work. It is therefore within the
province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be valid in the absence
of evidence that it was adopted for a discriminatory purpose. It is no less true that
time outside working hours, whether before or after work, or during luncheon or
rest periods, is an employee's time to use as he wishes without unreasonable restraint,
although the employee is on company property. It is therefore not within the province
of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation by an
employee outside of working hours, although on company property. Such a rule
must be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and therefore discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstances made the rule
necessary in order to maintain production and discipline." However, the question of
defining luncheon and rest periods can be a difficult one. Cf. Canton Cotton Mills,
148 N.L.R.B. No. 56, 57 L.R.R.M. 1033 (1964).
12. Meier & Frank Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1016 (1950); Goldblatt Bros., 79 N.L.R.B.
1262 (1948); J. L. Hudson, Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 1403 (1946); May Dep't Store Co.,
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Thomas v. Collins13 dramatized the Court's willingness to place
some of the efforts of non-employee organizers, as well as employees 14
within the sweep of the first amendment. The Court, while invalidating under the fourteenth amendment a state licensing requirement for
union speakers, was careful to limit their protection to "free speech
alone" or "merely giving and acquiring information" from "urging a
course of action" which might involve the "collection of funds or
securing subscriptions." This dichotomy between the realm of ideas
and commercial undertakings, a distinction necessarily tortuous and5
almost artificial, was followed again in Staub v. City of Baxley.
In considering the limitations that the state and the employer may
lawfully impose, Republic, Thomas and Staub require us to answer
the traditionally appropriate questions concerning the time, place
and manner 16 in which petitioners seek to conduct the activity in
question.
It is, of course, a truism that the respective limitations permitted
may not be analogous. The fact that Thomas and Staub do not
necessarily involve activity on the private property of non-consenting
owners serves to inhibit any rapid comparisons. But, nevertheless,
the Board's present distinctions, when viewed in the light of the
Court's approach in those cases and with regard for internal consistency, are-to say the least-curious. The Board in Stoddard-Quirk
Mfg. Co. 7 has recently held that different rules are to be applicable
59 N.L.R.B. 976 (1944), aff'd, 154 F.2d 533 (8th Cir. 1946). See particularly the
dissenting opinion in Meier, supra, of Members Houston and Styles at 1022 and
compare N.L.R.B. v. Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759, 762, 764, (5th Cir.
1960); Maxam Buffalo Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1040 (1962); Marshall Field & Co., 34
N.L.R.B. 1 (1941).
13. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). Cf. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
14. In Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1948), the Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Black, cited Republic as a case in support of both constitutional and statutory
rights for employees on company property. But see Mr. Justice Reeds dissent at 513.
15. 355 U.S. 313 (1958); accord, Adams v. City of Park Ridge, 293 F.2d 585
(7th Cir. 1961); See Note, 70 HArv. L. Rnv. 1271 (1957).
16. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
17. 138 N.L.R.B. 615, 616 (1962); "Implicit here . . . is a limitation on the
apparent scope of the principles enumciated in Walton..
" Neither Stoddard-Quirk,
Walton nor Peyton Packing has sought to categorize the wearing of union insignia
as solicitation or distribution. Apparent indecision on this point is reflected in Brewton
Fashions Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 1, p.3 n.4, 54 L.R.R.M. 1329 (1963); but see
Aladdin Indus. Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 167, 56 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1964); Cf. Kimble
Glass Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 484 (6th Cir. 1956), affirming 113 N.L.R.B. 577
(1955); Fabri-Tex, Inc., 148 N.L.R.B. 156, 57 L.R.R.M. 1213 (1964); Boeing
N.L.R.B. No. 70, 53 L.R.R.M. 1400 (1963); American Screen Prod. Co.,
138 N.L.R.B. 87 (1962); Edmont Mfg., 139 N.L.R.B. 1528 (1962); Bilton Insulation, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 1296 (1961); Mayrath Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1628 (1961),
aff'd, 319 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1963); Standard Fittings Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 928 (1961);
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to conduct defined as "solicitation" and that defined as "distribution."
In this case, a previous attempt to codify the law without regard to
such problems was discarded over the strong dissent of Members
Fanning and Brown.' 8 The Board majority wrote the following.
The distinguishing characteristic of literature as contrasted with oral
solicitation-and a distinction too often overlooked-is that its message is
of a permanent nature and that it is designed to be retained by the
recipient for reading or re-reading at his convenience. Hence, the purpose
is satisfied so long as it is received. 19
Thus, the Board held that the need for union distribution was less

than for solicitation, and that the employer's interest in order and
cleanliness was more adversely affected by the former than the latter.

This proposition was not a novel one20 as the Board has upon occasions
upheld the exclusion of union literature from the plant premises in the

interest of cleanliness21 and because of the availability of alternate
effective means of communication. 22 In Stoddard-Quirk, however, a
more limited expulsion, from the plant's "working area," was envisaged.
Stoddard-Quirk then presumes that literature has an effectiveness
which, unlike solicitation, is quite separable from plant working areas.
Stewart Hog Ring Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 310 (1961); Babcock & Wilcox Co., 128
N.L.R.B. 239 (1960); Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 184 (1960); Spielman
Motor Sales Inc., 127 N.L.R.B. 322 (1960); United Butchers Aubatoir Inc., 123
N.L.R.B. 946 (1959); Murphy Diesel Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 917 (1958), reversed, 263
F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1959); Caterpillar Tractor Co., 113 N.L.R.B. 553 (1955), reversed,
230 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956); Graber Mfg. Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 167 (1955); Safeway
Stores Inc., 110 N.L.R.B. 1718 (1954); Cherry Rivet Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 1303 (1952);
Salant & Salant Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 417 (1950). Insignia is protected where employees
have contact with the public to the extent that it is reasonable and does not detract
from the establishment's dignity. NLRB v. Floridan Hotel of Tampa, Inc., 318
F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1963); Daylight Grocery Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 100, 56 L.R.R.M.
1318 (1964); Harrahs Club, 143 N.L.R.B. 1356 (1963), reversel, 57 L.R.R.M. 2198
(9th Cir. 1964). See especially Gimbel Bros., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 56 L.R.R.M. 1287
(1964), where unidentified union flowers in a retail store were held to be unprotected.
And see Power Equip. Co., 135 N.L.R.B. 945 (1962), modified, 319 F.2d 861 (6th
Cir. 1963), wherein the Sixth Circuit indicated that the wearing of union bowling shirts
in an industrial establishment is a qualified right.
18. Stoddard-Quirk, supra note 17, at 625.
19. Id. at 620.
20. See Vanderheyden, Employee .Solicitation and Distribution: A Second Look, 14
LABoR L.J. 781, 786 (1963). There is not a great abundance of articles dealing with
solicitation and distribution problems. But see Burke, Employer Free Speech, 26
Foniwv L. REv. 266 (1957); Daykin, Employees' Right to Organize on Company
Time and Property, 42 ILL. L. REv. 301 (1947); Hanley, Union Organization on
Company Property-A Discussion of Property Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266 (1958); for
a very recent discussion, see Note, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 1049 (1964).
21. Tabib-Picker & Co., 50 N.L.R.B. 928 (1943).
22. Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951); Newport News
Children's Dress Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1521 (1950); contra, American Book-Stratford
Press Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 914 (1948).
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It will be retained for subsequent reading. But this is quite contrary
to the Board's other assumption-the peculiar needs that the employer
has in dealing with plant littering. As the dissent points out, there
is no basis upon which to assume the envisaged results. Will not the
average worker, according to the majority rationale, retain literature
and not litter? Why, as the dissent asks, should one expect workers
to throw pamphlets down at their work stations and not in nonworking areas?2
A decision more appreciative of industrial realities might have been
reached had the Stoddard-Quirk majority viewed this problem from
another vantage point. The employer is probably more concerned
with employee distraction than littering which could possibly, at
worst, involve expanded janitorial services. One might expect more
serious problems arising out of the circulation of authorization cards,
the protracted discussions and, perhaps, arguments involved in signing a pledge of association and transfer of money.2 This would seem
to raise at least as many problems as the distribution of literature.
Furthermore, the Board, notwithstanding Thomas and Staub, has
placed the commercial undertaking on a plane superior to conduct
more directly akin to free speech. Of course, solicitation is of primary
importance in the organizational drive. That fact reflects itself
through the inordinate sensitivity displayed by the majority in response to the dissents suggestion that ,authorization cards must
be characterized as distribution and thus be excluded from the plant
proper. But matter which is purely informational is generally, in
any context, the least disruptive and thus the first conduct to be
protected. Hence the priorities are reversed. This is not to suggest
another reversal but rather only to advocate a return to a broader
categorization treating solicitation and distribution as one type of
activity for these purposes as was done in Walton Mfg.5 In addition
to a failure to produce visible benefits, Stoddard-Quirk subjects labor
and management to the unnecessary detriment of uncertainty, an
element far too prevalent in this area of the law even before the
advent of this case. As mentioned before, the categorization of
authorization cards was the source of great dispute between the
majority and minority views.
23. Stoddard-Quirk, supra note 17, at 630 n.23.
24. Very often, however, union dues will not be exacted while workers are being
organized. See Note, 70 I-Hnv. L. REv. 1271 (1957).
25. 126 N.L.R.B. 697 (1960). At the same time it should be recognized that free
speech inherent in union "discussion" is protected in the plant proper, as well as
solicitation through authorization cards under Stoddard-Quirk. See Southwire Co.,
145 N.L.R.B. No. 127,.55 L.R.R.M. 1151 (1964); Cf. NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co., 277 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir. 1960).
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Stoddard-Quirk dictum supports inclusion of these cards within
the definition of solicitation.- Subsequently, however, the Board
2
equivocated 27 and then resolved the question in favor of solicitation, 1
the result hinted at in Stoddard-Quirk. The weighty resolution of
such relatively unimportant questions would seem to argue more
clearly than any illogical reasoning which the case contains, for that
doctrine's implausibility. Stoddard-Quirk's crucial defect, in this
writer's opinion, stems from the great confusion which will necessarily
exist in the minds of workers and employers, most of whom are not
party to sophisticated collective bargaining relationships in industries
like auto and steel, as to what their respective rights are, even on a
day-to-day basis. The worker acts upon peril of discharge when
indulging in the activity which may subsequently be classified as
"distribution." The employer risks back pay liability in the same
process. Because the distribution of literature is not excluded from
plant premises, but rather only working areas,29 the parties must also
hazard the sometimes difficult guess of determining what are working
and non-working areas. 30
Of course, Stoddard-Quirk is correct in pointing out a factual
distinction that is beyond dispute. But, by way of answer, the critic
must question the functional desirability of this approach. Even the
experienced labor lawyer might, at first blush, have difficulty with the
lengthy and rather complicated Board order that Stoddard-Quirk now
requires. 31 It would seem that the problems will cause more hardship
to the parties and prove more irksome to the Board than any benefit
to be gained. And this area, as we shall see below, is sufficiently
26. Stoddard-Quirk, supra note 17, at 620 n.6: "Wholly distinguishable, of course,
is the situation where an employee is asked to sign an authorization card. Our
dissenting colleagues exploit a semantic gambit by analogizing the solicitation of signatures on authorization cards to the distribution of 'literature.' This gambit, we respectfully suggest, is directed neither to the facts of this case nor to the facts posed
therein."
27. Gale Prod., 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1248 (1963).
28. Southwire Co., supra note 25.
29. Stoddard-Quirk, supra note 17, at 621 n.7: "Surely, even in small plants
employees are not so chained to their work stations that they have no opportunity
to distribute or receive union literature in some nonworking area at some time during
the course of a normal 8-hour day, e.g., luncheon breaks, restroom periods, coffee
breaks, timeclock punching, clothes changing, auto parking and simple entry into and
departure from the plant."
30. Willow Maintenance Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 64 (1963), aff'd per curlam, 332 F.2d
367 (2d Cir. 1964); Minneapolis Honeywell Regulator Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 849 (1962);
Miller Charles & Co., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 57 L.R.R.M. 1211 (1964).
31. See, e.g., General Indus. Electronics Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1373 (1962):
"Cease and desist from maintaining, enforcing, or applying a rule prohibiting employees from soliciting membership in any labor organization during nonworldng time
or from distributing literature on behalf of any labor organization during nonworking
time in nonworking areas of Respondents plant ......
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problematical without Stoddard-Quirk,so as to occupy the full attention of the Board and the courts for some time to come.
I.

NON-EwLOYEE ORGANmms AND THE "CAPnrVE AUDmNCE"

Undoubtedly the most debated. aspect of union activity on company
premises has centered around the "captive audience" situation, the
employer's effort to convey his views of trade unionism to the
employees through speeches on company time and property where
attendance is normally required.3 Judge Hand in NLRB v. Federbush
Co. eloquently described the peculiar difficulties presented to the
Board by such affirmative campaigning:
Language may serve to enlighten a hearer though it also betrays the

speaker's feelings and desires; but the light it sheds will be in some degree
clouded ifthe hearer is in his power. Arguments by an employer directed
to his employees have such an ambivalent character; they are legitimate
enough as such, and pro tanto the privilege of "free speech" protects them;

but, so far as they also disclose his wishes as they generally do, they have
a force independent of persuasion. . . What to an outsider will be no
more than the vigorous presentation of a conviction, to an employee may
be the manifestation of a determination which it is not safe to thwart.
The Board must decide how far the second aspect obliterates the first.34

Obviously the employer-employee relationship varies significantly
in many enterprises. Intelligent administration of the statute requires
that this factor be under thorough scrutiny. 35 At the same time, the
Board has most recently indicated that recognition of the "economic
realities of the employer-employee relationship . . ." may provide
greater latitude in setting aside elections influenced by employer
captive audiences. 36 Despite large union treasuries, there must be a
presumption that, in organizational campaigns where employers
utilize the company premises for electioneering, the preponderance
of strength lies in the hands of management. This disparity between
union power in established bargaining relationships is especially evident in rural areas and regions such as the South where unions are
not yet institutions. This seems to be acknowledged by a literal reading, to be discussed below, of a Supreme Court decision generally
32. See Texas City Chem. Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 115 (1954), wherein the speech
in question took place at a dinner paid for by the employer and attendance, with
families, was voluntary. Cf. Sam'1 Bingham's Son Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 1612 (1948).
33. 121 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1941); Cf. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314
U.S. 469 (1941); NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir.
1943); NLRB v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F.2d 905, 913 (6th Cir. 1940).
34. NLRB v. Federbush, supranote 33, at 957.
35. See, e.g., Burke, supra note 20, at 288, 289.
36. Dal-Tex Optical Co., Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1782, 1786-87 (1962); See also Oak
Mfg., 141 N.L.R.B. 1323 (1963); Trane Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1962).
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cited to exclude non-employee organizers from company property. 37

The deleterious impact of the captive audience upon self organization
efforts has been aptly described in the following comment:
while they are in the plant, employees customarily obey the instructions of
the company supervisors and officials. Habitual responses of this type tend
to operate whether the employee is responding to the desires of the employer that he should perform some shop operation or that he should
pursue some less objective course-such as voting against a certain union.
* . . [Tlhe display of power inherent in the compulsory audience
is itself
of considerable psychological significance. Field studies indicate how deeprooted is the feeling among workers that their future welfare depends upon
"not crossing the boss."3 8

In order to meet this problem, and thus the act's purpose of

spreading collective bargaining, the Board, in Clark Bros.,39 sought

to proscribe the employer captive audience as unlawful. Noting the
employer's control over employees during paid time, the Board

hinted at a future doctrine in lamenting management's "exclusive
access" to the workers' minds. Section 8(c) of the Taft-Hartley Act,

as amended, inscribed a proviso protecting non-coercive free speech
which was specifically devised to overrule Clark Bros. The Board
acknowledged such intent" and was thus put to new means to
effectuate equal opportunity for unions and employers.
The Supreme Court, in Kovacs v. Cooper4 provided some insights
into the problems that confronted the workers in Clark Bros. In that

case, the Court held that comment on a labor dispute transmitted
through a loud speaker going through public streets could be constitutionally prohibited as "loud" and "raucous" under a local ordinance.

One might say that the employer's speech cannot necessarily be
characterized in such a manner and that the privacy of the home
which the Court accorded much solicitude to in Kovacs, is not
analogous to the rights of employees on plant premises. A partial,

but poor, answer to this could be contained in the frequent use of
loudspeakers for employer addresses.4 That, however, could be
avoided with marginal difficulty, especially in small plants where loud37. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
38. Note, 14 U. Cm. L. REv. 104, 108-09 (1946).
39. 70 N.L.R.B. 802 (1946) (Member Reilly dissenting).
40. Babcock & Wilcox, 77 N.L.R.B. 577 (1948); Cf. S & S Corrugated Paper
Mach. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950).
The proviso reads as follows: "The expressing of any view, argument, or opinion
or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic or visual form,
shall not constitute an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
41. 336 U.S. 77 (1949); See the vigorous dissent of Mr. Justice Black at 102.
42. Cf. Phillips Control Corp., 129 N.L.R.B. 1485 (1961).
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speakers are not needed and the speech cannot be viewed as loud or
raucous and where, incidentally, workers are often in greatest need of
the act's protection. But, more important to our problem is the Court's
concern in reconciling cases upholding the constitutional right to
solicit at private homes43 which emphasized the unlimited breadth
of their approach to this captive audience problem:
The unwilling listener is not like the passerby who may be offered a

pamphlet in the street but cannot be made to take it. In his home or on
the street he is practically helpless to escape this interference with his
privacy by loudspeakers....44

In its pristine form then, the overruling of Clark Bros. can be
premised only upon employer property rights. On the other hand,
one must consider the argument advanced in some of the cases,
that the plant is more than employer property, rather it is the
community where the worker spends most of his existence. Thus,
returning to and comparing Kovacs, this argument would of necessity
analogize at least some of the rights sought after in the plant to those
which can be enjoyed in the streets or so-called public places. Thus
for instance it would not be entirely facetious, though admittedly
45
unrealistic and impractical, to inquire if the wearing of earplugs
or devices that would drown out the employer's speech would be
protected by section 7 and the first amendment. Since the overruling of Clark Bros. rejected the constitutional right of non-assembly,
could Kovacs be employed as a vehicle to obtain the right not to
listen? Judge Hand once again advanced the most sensible proposal
to bridge the gap left by Clark Bros. and the Board was soon to find
it acceptable.
In NLRB v. Clark Bros.,46 the Second Circuit rejected the Board's
Clark Bros. doctrine, but indicated by way of dictum that a violation
could be found if the employer refused a union's request to reply.
Implicit here was a utilization of the non-employee organizer on
company premises so as to redress the organizational imbalance and
to answer questions for which some expertise about trade unionism
is prerequisite. The Board accepted this principle in the landmark
case of Bonwit Teller47 In that case the Board announced the prin43. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S.
141 (1943).
44. Kovacs, supra note 41, at 86. (Emphasis added.)
45. It would be somewhat tendentious to argue that this would fall within the
category of union insignia. Insignia which is not identified as union material would
not seem to be protected. See Gimbel Bros., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 56 L.R.R.M.
1287 (1964).
46. 163 F.2d 373 (2d Cir. 1947); contra, NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946).
47. 96 N.L.R.B. 608 (1951) (Member Reynolds dissenting).
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ciple of an employee's "right to hear both sides of the story under
circumstances which reasonably approximate equality." The confusing element of this case arose from the peculiarly broad no-solicitation rules accorded retail department stores such as Bonwit Teller.
Because Bonwit Teller had a privileged rule prohibiting solicitation
in selling areas during both working and non-working hours, the
Board noted that its result was "particularly persuasive" and
"compelling." The Board, relying on Republic, reasoned that "an
otherwise valid no-solicitation rule violates the Act where it is
enforced and applied in a discriminatory manner... ." The Bonwit
theory however is not entirely clear because the Board concluded with
the remark that the rule's scope made the holding "particularly
compelling." The case's unfortunate and imprecise language may
have done more than anything else to cloud the law in this area.
On appeal the Second Circuit abandoned the Bonwit doctrine in so
far as it was independent of a no-solicitation rule or derived from
Republic (thus retreating from their holding in Clark Bros.) and
graciously accepted the alternative holding that the Board had
posed for them in dictum. Judge Hand, writing for the majority, 8
held that the Board's order was too broadly drawn:
[Tlhe violation here was the discriminatory application of the no-solicitation

rule. If Bonwit Teller were to abandon that rule, we do not think it
would then be required to accord the Union a similar opportunity to
address the employees each time Rudolph [the employer] makes an antiunion speech. Neither the Act nor reason compels such an "eye for an
eye, tooth for a tooth" result so long as the avenues of communication are
kept open to both sides. 49

The Second Circuit continued to apply the "avenue of communication" approach in subsequent cases.50 This alteration of the
Bonwit Teller doctrine was destined to play a significant role. But
the Board went on to apply the Bonwit principle to an industrial
establishment without broad rules prohibiting solicitation in Biltmore
Mfg.-51 Subsequently the Board edged away from reliance on the
no-solicitation rule and thus closer to the notion that employer
48. Bonwit Teller, Inc. v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1952).
49. Id. at 646.
50. See NLRB v. American Tube Bending Co., 205 F.2d 45, 46 (2d Cir.),
affirming 102 N.L.R.B. 735 (1953): "since the respondent refused to allow any
solicitation during non-worldng hours, that was in itself an unfair labor practice, for
it did not operate a retail store; and it was an added unfair practice for it to address
solicitation during non-working hours, that was in itself an unfair labor practice, for
not join the statement that it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to address
his employees ....
205 F.2d at 47.
51. 97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951). Biltmore is distinguishable from Bonwit and other
cases involving union rebuttals to a captive audience in that here an employee rather
than a non-employee requested an opportunity to reply.
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utilization of plant premises for captive audience speeches is so
devastating as to make the existence or non-existence of any solicita5 3 where a no-solicition rule irrelevant. 52 In Metropolitan Auto Parts
tation rule was not in existence, both the Republic and Second Circuit
"avenues of communication" theories were discarded in finding both
54
an 8(a) (1) violation and unfair conduct warranting a new election.
Currently the Board believes that both the Board and Second
Circuit opinions in Bonwit Teller are "legally sound."55 That rather
contradictory comment will require much explanation in future cases.
It cannot be clear whether the Board now accepts (1) the notion
implicit in Republic that the speech itself is a violation of the nosolicitation rule as the employer's only legitimate prohibition stems
from a concern for production or discipline which cannot be present
when the employer himself takes the worker's attention; (2) the
idea that plant premises are too important in the organizational
campaign and captive audiences too harmful to go without correction
upon proper request; or (3) Judge Hand's "avenues of communication" concept. One would hope however that the Board is adopting
one of the first two courses of action. There is some support for the
first choice. 56 The second possibility would seem, in the light of
subsequent cases to be the least likely one. However, Supreme Court
cases which have intervened since Bonwit and the general tenor of
Board reasoning in May Dep't Stores,5 7 all indicate that the Board is
adopting the third course of action. That approach cannot be cited
correctly as the Board's version of Bonwit and this ambiguity should
be clarified at the first opportunity.
The Sixth Circuit was not as hospitable to the Bonwit Teller
doctrine as Judge Hand. Rather than qualify or modify the doctrine,
that court rejected it outright. In NLRB v. Woolworth 8 the first
amendments possible applicability was discussed at length with the
conclusion that Bonwit might well violate the Constitution. To begin
52. See, Bellknap Hardware & Mfg. Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 484 (1952); Bernadin Bottle
Cap Co., Inc., 97 N.L.R.B. 1559 (1952); Cf. F. W. Woolworth Co., 105 N.L.R.B.
214 (1953); Shirlington Supermarket Inc., 102 N.L.R.B. 312 (1953), aff'd, 224 F.2d
649 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955); Onondaga Pottery Co., 100
N.L.R.B. 143 (1952); Wilson & Co. Inc., 100 N.L.R.B. 1512 (1952).
53. 102 N.L.R.B. 1634 (1953).
54. Chairman Herzog, concurring in part only, would have set the election aside
because of unfair conduct but would not have found an 8(a)(1) violation. This is a
distinction that will be developed below.
55. May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 799 (1962).,
56. James Hotel Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 761 (1963). In this case captive audience
addresses were considered solely in terms of a violation of then-.solicitation rule.
A violation, however, was not found.
57. 136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962).
58. 214 F.2d 78 (6th Cir. 1954), reversing 102 N.L.R.B. 581 (1953).
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with, the court indulged in a slight misstatement of the question at
hand in characterizing it as a question of whether the union was
entitled to reply to captive audiences for an "equal amount of time
during working hours. . .

."

Although this error is only slight, it

nevertheless has served as a red flag for a judiciary hostile, and rightfully so, to inflexible remedies. The Bonwit doctrine is not necessarily
so rigid as "equal time" but rather the right to reply under "similar
circumstances" or, as quoted above, the right to "approximate"
equality. Indeed the employer need not even countenance the right
of "reply" but could, pursuant to Bonwit, purposely schedule the
union speech before his contemplated address. 9 The caveat here,
however, should be to restrict the employer's latitude to a rule of
reasonableness. For instance, it would be grossly unfair to permit
management to offer the union an opportunity to make a speech three
or four weeks before the election and then present their side in the
immediate interval before election eve.
In Woolworth, the Sixth Circuit stated that the constitutional question could be skirted because of congressional enactment of section
8(c) which, the court said, "imposes no limitation upon the expression
of the employer's views except that they must not contain a threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." 60 Thus the court said that
the constitutionality of congressional enactment need not be considered. The court recognized that section 8(c) was motivated, at
least in part, by constitutional considerations. But the following
comment, when squared with the result reached, makes Woolworth
a model of judicially created assumptions:
The purpose of the enactment was to guarantee to employers as well as
unions the right of free speech. In view of the legislative history of the

principle embodied in the First Amendment ...its addition to the original
National Labor Relations Board Act is an authoritive direction given by
Congress to the Board to apply the First Amendment on behalf of the

employer as well as the employee. The section was enacted to remedy the
situation which arose from the holdings of the Board under the Wagner
Act that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to address his
in opposition to a union even though his address was entirely
employees 61
uncoercive.

The court was perfectly correct in its conclusion that section 8(c)
was aimed at Clark Bros. But of course Clark Bros. was not the issue
in Woolworth. The idea that section 8(c) is premised on first amendment considerations is also a valid one. The Seventh Circuit, prior
59. See Note, 61 YAIFu L.J. 1066, 1078 (1952).
60. Woolworth, supra note 58, at 79.
61. Id. at 79, 80.
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to Woolworth, in NLRB v. La Salle Steel Corp."' had succinctly
analyzed 8(c)'s meaning as a simple incorporation of the Thomas v.
Collins free speech principle into the act. The Sixth Circuit assumed,
however, that the plant was the employer's forum and that the union's
forum, when contact was possible as it was in Woolworth, was
relegated to non-company property such as the meeting place utilized
in Thomas.
Employer dominance of plant property rather than free speech was
the underlying assumption in Woolworth.6 3 The court holds that
section 8(c) derives from the first amendment and, as Thomas had
already stated, free speech in labor disputes is for both parties. Section
8(c) ordered the Board not to thwart, through Clark Bros., the free
speech rights of employers while on plant premises. This did not
affect the corresponding question of union rights on company property. Furthermore, if the Seventh Circuit is correct, the impact of
section 8(c) is to accord more authority to union free speech and
thus, arguably, advance the Constitution into the area from which
the Sixth Circuit has found it to be excluded.
It is, of course, possible to rationalize Woolworth as excluding
non-employees rather than employees from company property, a
distinction that the Supreme Court was to draw two years later.
But this distinction did not seem of importance at this time, although,
admittedly this could have been another judicial assumption not
worthy of discussion. If so, however, a subsequent Sixth Circuit
decision upholding the right of non-employees to be on company
property, even without the Woolworth captive audience, would be
quite contradictory. The court's answer to this could well be that
available contacts in the latter case were quite unlike those available
in Woolworth,64 or that the company speeches, as distinguished from
other types of solicitation, which were present in Woolworth, are more
inherently disruptive to production. These distinctions may have some
justification, but they go unstated. One must 65read Woolworth as
primarily grounded on broader considerations.
To say that union free speech may be exercised on what is,
according to property law, 66 company property is not to say that
the union may utilize company property unrelated, or at least not
62. 178 F.2d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963 (1950).
63. The concurring opinion of Judge Miller (though premised on a different factual
analysis) articulates this assumption more explicitly. Woolworth, supra note 58, at
84-86.
64. NLRB v. Ranco, Inc., 222 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1955), affirming per curiam
109 N.L.R.B. 998 (1954).
65. Cf. NLRB v. Lake Superior Lumber Corp., 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).
66. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfirter in Marsh v. Alabama,
supra note 14, at 511.
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directly related 67 to the plant enterprise. For instance, in Bendix
Corp.6 8 it was held lawful for an employer to refuse to permit his
equipment to be used for the production of union literature. The
employer's requirement that he control the "use" of his own equipment was a "reasonable one." Even where an employer, unlike the
fact situation in Bendix Corp., indulged in affirmative action, such as
captive audience speeches or distribution of literature, it would seem
unreasonable, on this basis alone,69 to require the employer to permit
the union to use management equipment to publish replies or copies
of a speech that the union might give. Here property is of a more
personal nature. It is not so closely related to the worker as to give
him the vested interests that may be applicable to plant premises.
Judge McAllister, dissenting in Woolworth, would appear to have
written the superior opinion there. He asserted that the court was
bound by the broad guidelines enunciated in Thomas to the effect
that "the Act included the right of the employees to freely discuss
and be informed concerning their collective bargaining rights and
the correlative rights of the union to discuss with and inform them
concerning the matters involved. . . . ,, 0 Prophetically the dissent
articulated the concept that seems to be the dominant theme, in
part, for the Board and some of the courts: "the place of work has
been recognized to be the most effective place for the communication of information and opinion concerning organization." 7 But, as
if to counter this perceptive dissent, the Woolworth majority was
able to rely on a new Board decision which philosophically superceded
Bonwit and quite certainly overruled the Bonwit Teller doctrine.
In Livingston Shirt,2 the Board held that, in the absence of either
an unlawful broad no-solicitation rule which prohibited union access
to company premises on other than working time, or a privileged
broad no-solicitation rule, an employer did not commit an unfair
labor practice through a pre-election speech on company time and
premises while denying the union's request for an opportunity to
reply. The Livingston Shirt rule would seem to be an acknowledgement of the Second Circuit's views. However, some very strong
dictum makes the tenor of Livingston Shirt considerably more extreme. The Board equated the union hall (thereby assuming that
67. See NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
68. 131 N.L.R.B. 599 (1961), aff'd, 299 F.2d 308 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 827 (1962).
69. This is not to say that a discriminatory use might not, in a proper case, afford
use or access to the union.
70. Woolworth, supranote 58, at 90.
71. Id. at 91.
72. 107 N.L.R.B. 400 (1953) (Member Peterson concurring separately and Member
Murdock dissenting).
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one would always be in existence) with the employer's premises and
said that there would be no difference between permitting union
replies to captive audience addresses than requiring the employer's
admission to the union hall. It is thus clear that Livingston Shirt
meant to reject completely the Bonwit notion of inherent inequality
resulting from captive audiences: "an employer's premises are the
natural forum for him just as the union hall is the inviolable forum
for the union to assemble and address employees." 73 The short
answer to Livingston Shirt might be that of accepting the analogy of
the union hall and company premises as a serious one and thus
attempt to devise a rule that would give the employer an opportunity to respond at a union meeting. Although there could be
potential surveillance violations of section 8(a)(1), the result to
be hoped for in these cases is a free flow of ideas where employees
can, in actuality, hear both sides of the question. In any event, surveillance should be of insignificant concern in the organizational
campaign at the point when the union has come out into the open
to the extent of challenging company speeches. Of course, the timing
may not be that of the union because of employer affirmative action.
The really surprising aspect of Livingston Shirt dictum is the
almost Marxist class warfare notion of what the rules of the game
are to be: "we do not think one party must be so strangely openhearted as to underwrite the campaign of the other."74 Many portions
of the act stem from deep distrust of both parties' "good intentions."
But it is one thing to recognize such a pattern and to try and remedy
it with solutions, and it is another matter to encourage it. The

latter is what the Board did in Livingston Shirt.
Finally, Livingston Shirt conjured up unreal visions of Bonwit,
characterizing that decision as a "forensic seesaw" which would require replies ad infinitum. As pointed out above, this is a false
analysis of Bonwit. That case permitted the employer, perhaps
wrongly, to adjust all timing problems to his needs.
The Livingston Shirt rationale is almost identical to Woolworth

except for the latter case's emphasis on constitutional questions. The
Livingston Shirt majority could not afford to speak constitutionally,
even if they were able15 because of a companion case, Peerless Plywood.7 6 In this case it was held that a speech within twenty-four
hours of the election would require the election to be set aside, as
73. Id. at 406.
74. Id. at 406.
75. Although an administrative agency has no power to adjudicate constitutional
questions, it may express opinions.
76. 107 N.L.R.B. 427 (1953).
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distinct from an unfair labor practice violation."7 Peerless Plywood
held that the "real vice" was the "last minute character" of the
speech. The rule here, which deals with only speeches and not
literature, 78 goes to the difficulties involved in a union reply in such
a short time and the inevitable effect of propaganda just before the
election. Since the rule only prohibits speech and not literature,
Peerless Plywood implicitly accepts the charge that an employer's
speech is an especially powerful weapon in the hands of management.
It is interesting to note, however, that Peerless Plywood, analytically
speaking, is more of an encroachment upon section 8(c) than was
Bonwit. During the twenty-four hour period speech is prohibited
entirely. Neither a monologue nor a dialogue is contemplated, only
silence. Conduct which necessitates setting aside an election, however, cannot be protected by 8(c), unlike the situation in unfair labor
9
practice cases.
This does not detract from the significance of the problem that
Peerless Plywood seeks to meet. Bonwit as interpreted by the Second Circuit, emphasized the inequities arising from employer speeches
just before the election. In the wake of Bonwit, some argued that the
fact that one of the employer's speeches was two hours before polling
time, thereby making an effective reply impossible, was the dominant
theme. 80
77. Pursuant to section 9(c)(1) of the act the Board is to resolve a question
of representation through an election by secret ballot, In determining whether an
election should be set aside the Board must examine the standards of election conduct
which are "considerably more restrictive than the test of conduct which may amount
to interference, restraint, coercion violative of Section 8(a)(1)." TWENTY-EiGHTu
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BoAm 60 (1963).

A pre-

election atmosphere of "laboratory conditions" is the requisite standard. General Shoo
Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 499 (1951).
78. See Carlton Forge Works, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 94, 55 L.R.R.M. 1407 (1964)
(Member Brown dissenting on other grounds).
79. In election cases the Board is not limited, as it is in unfair labor practice
proceedings, by the free speech provision of section 8(c). See, for instance, TWENTvFTFn

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

BOABD 50 (1960).

The rationale for setting an election aside is cogently summarized in
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BoARD

TwENTY-EIcnI

56 (1963): "An election

will be set aside and a new election directed if it was accompanied by conduct which,
in the Board's view, created an atmosphere of confusion or fear of reprisals which
interfered with the employees' freedom of choice of a representative as guaranteed by
the Act. In evaluating the interference resulting from specific conduct, the Board does
not attempt to assess its actual effect on the employees, but rather concerns itself with
whether it is reasonable to conclude that the conduct tended to prevent a free formation and expression of the employees' choice."
80. See most recently Claymore Mfg. Co. of Arkansas, Inc., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 153,
55 L.R.R.M. 1080 (1964), wherein a Board majority (Chairman McCulloch and
Member Brown dissenting) refused to set aside an election one of the grounds being
that the union had ample time in which to reply to propaganda circulated throughout
a small rural community.
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Peerless Plywoods complete prohibition of speech is not the most
telling argument against that case:
The administrative process for setting aside an election normally takes
about six months, while an election left standing bars a new election under
the Act, for a period of a year. Under the instant decision, an employer
uncertain of winning against an undesired union has little to lose and much
to gain from attempting to influence the election by calling and speaking
to an employee assembly within the twenty four hour period. If he loses
the election despite the speech he has lost nothing: if he wins, the election
will be set aside but he has gained approximately six months before the
administrative process is completed and a new election held-he has
gambled only the possibility of winning without the speech, which would
have barred the union for a year. Such tactics, immune from a cease and
desist order, could be repeated a number of times. This possibility of
abuse .

.

. seems to require now that . . . all speeches within the twenty

four hour period [be] unfair labor practices as well as grounds for setting
81
aside an election.

The Board's vastly increased case load during the ten years since
that was written makes this problem more intolerableP2 It is further

submitted that the twenty-four hour period is unrealistically short
and that a longer period, providing more alternatives and remedial
flexibility, would be more sensible and compatible with free speech

principles. This point will be expanded below.

84
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox8 3 and NLRB v. United Steelworkers

(Nutone and Avondale Mills) are a watershed in solicitation law.
Neither case presented a captive audience problem, but both have
had a profound impact on speeches as well as other types of solicitation.
In Babcock, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished the
rights of non-employees5 from employees insofar as the right to
81. Note, 54 COLuM. L. REv. 632, 635 (1954).
.82. At the present time it is true, however, that a special expediting unit resolves
representation cases more quickly than the normal process.
83. 351 U.S. 105 (1956), consolidating Ranco, Inc., 109 N.L.R.B. 998 (1954),
aff'd per curiam, 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955). Cf. Caldwell Furniture Co., 97
NL.R.B. 1501, uff'd per curiam, 199 F.2d 267 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
907 (1953); Carolina Mills Inc., 02 N.L.R.B. 1141, aff'd, 190 F.2d 675 (4th Cir. 1951).
84. 357 U.S. 357 (1958).
85. Employees who are part of an appropriate bargaining unit are nevertheless
considered as nonemployees when on the physically separate premises of the same
employer. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 749 (1959), aff'd, 277 F.2d 759
(5th Cir. 1960). A more liberal spirit is displayed in Cranston Print Works Co., 117
N.L.R.B. 1834, 1842 (1957), reversed, 258 F.2d 206 (4th Cir. 1958): "In determining
to whom this right to distribute union literature extends, we believe that the
materiality of employment interests of all employees of a single employer, whether they
are working, or on strike, or on leave of absence or sick leave, or temporary lay off,
or temporary transfer, or have been discriminatorily discharged or about to quit,
is no less determinative of this right than it is of the right to engage in other selforganization activities fostered and protected by the Act."
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distribute literature on company parking lots was concerned. In
that case the Court clearly adhered to the Republic rationale for
employees. 86 The exact holding of the case is not entirely obvious.
Stoddard-Quirk might argue for the proposition that the holding,
whatever it is, is strictly limited to cases involving "distribution" (the
union organizers in all the cases adjudicated were handbilling parking
lots) as distinguished from "solicitation." But the Stoddard-Quirk's
majority's own disclaimer on this point 87 blunts that argument's sharpness. The holding then, encompassing both solicitation and distribution, would appear to be the following:
It is our judgment .

.

. that an employer may validly post his property

against non-employee distribution of union literature if reasonable efforts
by the union through other available channels of communication will enable

it to reach the employees with its message and if the employer's notice
or order does not discriminate against the union by allowing other distribution.88

Besides the linguistic ambiguities contained in the quotation above,
the Court's concluding remarks in the Babcock opinion lead one to
believe that the existence of alternate routes of communication is to
be the only, or primary, consideration affecting the rights of nonemployee organizers. Yet a literal reading of the quoted passage
supports the view that an employer may exclude non-employees only
if both of two factors are present: in short, that the Court's opinion
must be read conjunctively rather than disjunctively.
Since Babcock did not overrule the Court's decision in NLRB v.
Stowe Spinning,9 it would appear that that case's holding to the
effect that an employer could not discriminatorily exclude non-employees from company property is preserved. On the other hand,
the channels of communication theory, especially if read as an exclusive criterion would relegate the Stowe case to the company town
or isolated enterprise category. Certain dictum of the Court in
Stowe would support the latter view 0 But the Board did not seem
to place this interpretation on the case in Bonwit.91 And the Court, in
Babcock, notes the importance of the discrimination present in
Stowe.
As indicated above, Babcock retains the theory of cases like NLRB
86. Babcock, supra note 83, at 113: "The distinction [between nonemployees and
employees] is one of substance. No restriction may be placed on the employees' right
to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the employer can demonstrate
that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline." (citing Republic).
87. Stoddard-Quirk, supra note 17, at 619 n.5.
88. Babcock, supra note 83, at 112.
89. 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
90. Id. at 230.
91. See Bonwit, supra note 47, at 613 n.10.
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v. Lake Superior92 which permitted non-employees to enter on company property in isolated lumber camps where the employees lived
on company property and could not be reached through other means.
In General Dynamics 93 the Board has indicated a propensity to brush
aside the concept of discrimination as a relevant factor and to substitute the necessity of special considerations in upholding union claims,
e.g., company town. However, it is beyond doubt that the Court, in
Stowe, unlike the Board 94 premised the violation on discrimination
and not geography.
In post-Babcock cases, the Board, while reluctant to find violations
on this basis, has adhered to the concept of discriminatory 8(a)(1)
violations as applicable to acts committed against non-employees on
company property.95 Such reluctance was overcome in the Salyer
Stay Ready 96 dissent of Chairman McCulloch which found a violation in the case of violence committed against an organizer in a
public street. 97 The extreme fact situation presented in Salyer Stay
Ready (and the case's ability to attract only one member in support
of a violation) point up some of the incongruities inherent in Babcock.
Republic says that discrimination is presumptively evident when
an employer prohibits solicitation on non-working time because the
activity conducted at such a time in most instances does not hurt
production. But the organizer, in ordinary circumstances, cannot be
on company property during working time at which time his activity
would raise the employer's only defense accorded under Republic.
How then does one find discrimination? Perhaps something extra is
needed. This must be the approach that brought forth Chairman
McCulloch's dissent in Salyer Stay Ready. It is not quite facetious to say that in order to find a violation, barring evidence of
92. Supra note 65.

206 (1940).

See also NLRB v. Waterman

Steamship Corp., 309

U.S.

93. 137 N.L.R.B. 1725 (1962) (Member Brown dissenting).
94. Stowe Spinning Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 614 (1946); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co., 92
N.L.R.B. 1344 (1951), wherein the Board held that a company violated section
8(a)(1) in a company town setting without the discrimination present in Stowe.
95. Bludworth Const. Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 385 (1959), but see the dissent of Members
Rodgers and Bean at 389: "In that case [Babcock] the Supreme Court ruled squarely
that if no other 'distribution' is allowed, the exclusion of nonemployee organizers
from company property is to be tested against the availability of other channels of
communication with the employees. To the extent that our colleagues have applied
the Babcock & Wilcox rule in this case, we are in accord with what they have done.
We disagree with them, however, to the extent that they have superimposed upon the
Babcock & Wilcox rule an additional test of 'discriminatory violation.' The Supreme
Court decision in Babcock & Wilcox is not, in our opinion, susceptible to this treatment. Our colleagues are therefore in error."
96. 136 N.L.R.B. 1210 (1962). Cf. Southwire Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 83 (1961), aff'd
per curiam, 313 F.2d 638 (5th Cir. 1963).
97. Id. at 1211.
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violence, one must find near hatred for the union on the part of the
employer or at least a background of discriminatory conduct. Yet,
as we shall see, there are good reasons, not articulated in the dissent,
for analogizing this case's public street to Stowe's meeting ball and
making them crucial considerations.
To return to Babcock, the Court there spoke of the absence of
"other distribution" as a necessary element in the exclusion of union
organizers. Presumably this means outside activity such as charities 9
or the organization of a competing or incumbent union. On this point
it is not clear if the union seeking entrance must be admitted to the
plant proper or working areas and/or be admitted during working
hours if the charities or other unions are given such privileges. The
Board, in General Dynamics, said that employee activity could not
constitute "other distribution" 99 though other factors argued for a result
contrary to the one reached in that case. However, it would seem that
any employer agents, such as visiting businessmen and other community leaders who make speeches or distribute literature would
constitute "other distribution." 00
The crucial question concerns the status of the employer's own
activity. Livingston Shirt, we must remember, served to immunize
a good deal of employer campaigning. In Goldblatt Bros.,101 an
election case, the Board promulgated the somewhat astonishing rule
that an employer could not violate his own no-solicitation rule. This
was a complete repudiation of any Bonwit theory and the Supreme
Court provided some corrective relief in NLRB v. United Steelworkers.102 This decision consolidated two Board cases which the
Court held were "controlled by the same considerations." Since the
dissent, as written by Mr. Chief Justice Warren, premised its reasoning on a distinction between the cases, it becomes important to
study the separate facts of each.
In Nutone, Inc.,0 3 the Board held, as in Goldblatt Bros., that valid

plant rules do not "control" the employer's action and that such
employer freedom was in the nature of "management prerogatives."
Here a company rule prohibiting both solicitation during working time
and distribution on company property by employees was promulgated prior to an organizational drive but was not enforced until
the campaign was being conducted. The union did not challenge
98. Cf. Mira-Pak Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 56 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1964); Revere
Camera Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1657 (1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962).
99. Supra note 93.
100. NLRB v. American Furnace Co., 158 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1946). Cf. Byrds
Manufacturing Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 147 (1962).
101. 119 N.L.R.B. 1711, 1714 (1958).
102. Supra note 84.
103. 112 N.L.R.B. 1153 (1955).
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the rule's validity in itself (though even under Stoddard-Quirk the
distribution rule would be bad), but rather charged that the company violated 8(a) (1) by their distribution of literature in the face
of the rule. The Board majority held that expressions of opinion
were protected by section 8(c) and could, apparently, under no
circumstances other than coercion be unfair labor practices. According to the Board, Nutone was governed by the principle of Livingston Shirt. The dissent of Member Murdock distinguished Livingston
Shirt as relating to speeches and maintained that union halls, the
Livingston Shirt counterpart of employer speeches, were not appropriate for the distribution of literature. More important, Member
Murdock noted the "surcharged atmosphere" of independent unfair
labor practices in Nutone and thus distinguished Woolworth where
the employer speech stood alone. On appeal, Judge Prettyrnan writing for the District of Columbia Circuit Court, 1 4 reversed the Board
majority but narrowed Member Murdock's dissent. With regard to
section 8(c) the court commented:
It wipes out the obligation of an employer to afford affirmatively to his

employees equal opportunity with himself to distribute or solicit. But it
does not wipe out the basic rule that in order to enforce a no-distribution
rule against employees the employer must have a valid reason. 105

The court held that the defense of concern for production and
efficiency were thus eliminated by the employer's activity.
In Avondale Mills' 06 the Board found a violation of the act. In
this case the company maintained that it had a "long standing" rule
on solicitation but the workers testified that they knew of no such
rule. The Board said:
instead of generally publicizing its newly adopted or revived rule to
employees, as one would expect of an employer solely concerned with plant
production and efficiency, the Respondent, at the very inception of the
Union's membership drive singled out a number of employees ostensibly
suspected of engaging in union solicitation during working hours to be
warned against a repetition of the reported offense. Apparently, antiunion

solicitation was not made an offense. 107

Furthermore the Board noted that "talking" on a number of subjects
was permitted, that supervisors utilized discussions with employees
during working hours to make unlawful threats and interrogations
and that there was no "concrete evidence" to show that production
was "impaired" by union solicitation. Thus, distinguishing Nutone,08s
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 243 F.2d 593 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
Id. at 600.
115 N.L.R.B. 840 (1956).
Id. at 841.
Id. at 842 n.8: "The Board's decision in Nutone Incorporated, 112 N.L.R.B.
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the Board held that the rule was "invoked" to defeat self organization
rights and thus violated section 8(a) (1). The Fifth Circuit reversed
the Board on the rule's validity and held that Nutone required a
contrary result.
In Steelworkers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority
of the Court, seemed to pledge obedience to the Republic theory. 109
The Court, using solicitation and distribution as interchangeable
terms, posed the question presented in this fashion:
The very narrow and almost abstract question here derives from the claim
that when the employer himself engages in antiunion solicitation that if
engaged in by employees would constitute a violation of the rule, particularly
when his solicitation is coercive or accompanied by other unfair labor
practices, his enforcement of an otherwise valid no solicitation rule against
the employees is itself an unfair labor practice. We are asked to rule that
the coincidence of these circumstances necessarily violates the Act regardless of the way in which the particular controversy arose or whether the
employer's conduct to any considerable degree created an imbalance in
the opportunities for organizational communication. 110

To do this, the Court said, would show "indifference" to the Board's
responsibility to recognize diverse circumstances. Here there was
no indication in the record of either case "that the employees or the
unions on their behalf requested the employer, himself engaging in
anti-union solicitation, to make an exception to the rule for pro-union
solicitation.""' Although the Court noted the "clear anti-union bias"
of both employers, it refused to assume that such a request would
be rejected "although it might well have been open to the Board to
conclude as a matter of industrial experience.. ." that a request was
futile. This then was the case's first defect in the view of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter.
Second, the Court admonished the Board for not finding whether
the rule had "truly diminished the ability of the labor organizations
involved to carry their message to the employees." Citing the Babcock
rule of alternate communications as "highly relevant," the majority
opinion stated the following:
[T]he Taft-Hartley Act does not command that the labor organizations as a
matter of abstract law, under all circumstances, be protected in the use of
every possible means of reaching the minds of individual workers nor that
they are entitled to112use a medium of communication simply because the
company is using it.
1153, does not preclude reliance on the anti-union conduct of the Respondent's supervisors as evidence of discriminatory motivation underlying the adoption or revival
of the no-union-solicitation rule."
109. NLRB v. United Steelworkers, supra note 84, at 361.
110. Id. at 362.
111. Id. at 363.
112. Id. at 364.
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Thus, the Court said, mechanical answers would not avail and
that where plant location, facilities and other resources made union
communication opportunities "at least as great as the employer's
ability to promote the legally authorized expression of his anti-union
13
views, there is no basis for invalidating these otherwise valid rules.""
The Court was careful to state that, in proper circumstances, an employer could commit an unfair labor practice by violating his own
rule but that "there must be some basis in the actuality of industrial
4
relations for such a finding.""
Justices Black and Douglas dissented in both cases as they would
have affirmed Judge Prettyman's opinion in Nutone. They joined
Mr. Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Avondale Mills. For the Chief
Justice, the "pivotal distinction" between the cases was that the
anti-union activity was coercive in itself, whereas this element was
lacking in Nutone.
The dissent dismissed Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concern with a
failure to request as a "slender reed." Here, said the dissent, "in
contrast to Babcock and Republic we are not concerned . . .with
the validity of these rules per se. The no-solicitation rule under
examination here may well be valid if fairly applied."" 5 While
holding that section 8(c) protected non-coercive speech, the dissent
at the same time viewed "plant premises and working time" as "decisive factors" that argued, in Avondale Mills, for a violation.

II. THm

oF Babcock Azw Steelworkers
A careful reading of the Steelworkers majority opinion indicates
that Goldblatt Bros., Woolworth and certainly the Board's version
of "management prerogatives" in Nutone are no longer good law.
Moreover, to the extent that the Board in Nutone characterized
Livingston Shirt as support for absolute non-coercive employer free
speech under 8(c), Steelworkers would seem also to have set that
doctrine aside. At the outset of Steelworkers, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
stated that no one claimed that the employer may not "under proper
circumstances" engage in non-coercive anti-union speech protected
by the statute. Thus the right of non-coercive speech was qualified
into a right pertaining to "proper circumstances." This is the Board's
position in Bonwit-that is to say, that the circumstances are proper
if the union has an opportunity to reply. At the same time, Steelworkers makes it clear, at least in the non-captive audience area,
that the Court's position will not always coincide with Bonwit's per
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Id. at 367.
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se finding of unlawful conduct when an employer discriminatorily
violates his own rule during working hours. But the point is that
Steelworkers stands for the proposition that there are circumstances
in which non-coercive employer speech is not lawful. I realize that
this analysis will come as a great and perhaps unpleasant surprise
for many and appear to be hair splitting to others. My opinion is,
however, supported by the Court's statement that an employer may,
once again in certain circumstances, commit an unfair labor practice
by non-coercive anti-union solicitation.
Of course the ad hoc approach laid down in Steelworkers would
seem to be more of a reaction to per se rules rather than representative of a sensitivity to free speech questions hla Woolworth. And on
this point one should not be able to argue, as Member Murdock did
in his Nutone dissent, that the Court does not intend a limitation
on speech as opposed to literature. As mentioned above, the Court
used solicitation in its broad generic sense and one can rightfully
assume, especially in view of the Court's citation of Bonwit (Second
Circuit version) and Woolworth, that captive audience speeches fall
within the sweep of this opinion. Curiously enough, the dissent of
Chief Justice Warren brooks no accommodation with any concept
which can draw unfair labor practices out of non-coercive speech.
There is a countervailing argument to all of this. The Court held
that Babcock was "highly relevant '" 6 in determining whether plant
rules have been fairly applied. One can reasonably read Babcock's
"other distribution" criterion as implicit exclusion of employer activity. But the above mentioned characterization of 8(c) probably
answers this argument well enough to make the reader conclude,
especially in the context of "highly relevant" remarks, that the Court
is referring to the rule of alternate routes of communication. If
Babcock is read to sanction employer distribution, then Steelworkers
serves merely to qualify that interpretation.
One of the biggest areas of confusion in Steelworkers is that case's
treatment of Republic. Justice Frankfurter stated that the union made
no attempt to carry its message, presumably through non-plant media,
to the employees and further, citing Republic, that this was a vital
consideration in determining the rule's validity. Unlike Babcock,
Republic deals with employees and the lawful limitation of their
rights. As mentioned above, Justice Frankfurter cites that case
approvingly. Here, however, the Court is citing Republic for what
it clearly does not stand for. The Court in Republic noted the
following:
116. Id. at 363.
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Neither in the Republic nor the Le Tourneau cases can it properly be said
that there was evidence or a finding that the plant's physical location made
solicitation away from company property ineffective to reach prospective
union members. Neither of these is like a mining or lumber camp where
the employees pass their rest as well as their work time on the employer's
premises so that union organization must proceed upon the employer's
premises or be seriously handicapped. 117

Similarly the Board, in its Le Tourneaul" opinion expressly disavowed
the theory advanced in Steelworkers.
It is, of course, within the Court's prerogative to overrule or limit
Republic. Steelworkers, however, cites Republic correctly and then
incorrectly to support a new doctrine. One must conclude respectfully that Justice Frankfurter has misapplied that case. This mistake,
small in itself, is responsible for a good portion of the cloudiness
that afflicts solicitation law today.
The distinction between non-employees and employees as set
forth in Babcock, where non-employees sought access, is further
blurred by the Steelworkers (where only employees' rights, and not
those exercised by non-employees on their behalf, were in question),
holding that a request must be made and the Court's other worldy
observation that, despite clear anti-union bias, it need not be viewed
as futile. The Court overlooks the fact that the employer rule anticipates the request insofar as employees are concerned, and most
emphatically denies it. Affirmative campaigning by the employer in
the face of the rule would mean, if anything, a slighter chance that
the employer would heed a request. The necessity of request serves
a good purpose where non-employees seek access to company property. Unlike the employees, they are strangers to the premises and
the employer has a legitimate risk in protecting himself against liability, among other things. Perhaps the Court, by requiring the
request from either the union or the employees, is hinting at a
distrust of the union-employee relationship or, as is implied in Babcock, a skepticism concerning the actual interest that workers have
in exercising their rights of union activity. But, of course, the request
is not enough. The Court grafted some rather important qualifications on the Babcock rule concerning the availability of other channels of communication, as we shall see below. Because the Board
did not meet this question "the concrete basis for appraising the
significance of the employer's conduct is wanting." 119
Let us see what these alternatives are. The idea that personal
117. Republic Aviation, supra note 7, at 798-99.
118. Le Tourneau Co. of Georgia, 54 N.L.R.B. 1253, 1261, reversed, 143 F.2d 67
(5th Cir. 1944).
119. Supra note 109, at 364.
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contacts at home suffice for organizing employees before a Board
election is totally unrealistic. House contacts are of use in the very
early stages of the campaign when the union effort may still be
secretive. By its very nature, the purpose here must be to gain a
few key supporters. It is a tactic usually employed before questions
120
of non-employee rights on company property begin to arise.
Moreover, it must be recognized that policies which relegate the union

to ringing door bells may cause irritating, though not usually technical,
invasions of individual privacy. Mr. Justice Reed, the author of

Babcock, was extremely sensitive to the values of privacy in one's
own home in other cases. The Babcock rule, in this request, runs
121
counter to the consideration of privacy.
Livingston Shirt extols the values of the union hall but even
assuming the existence of a union hall, the distance and inconvenience
of night meetings cannot begin to compare with the employer's re-

sources. 122 The Board has held, in Joseph Bancroft,'23 that a union
hall plus other means of communication are not necessarily enough
to provide the pre-election laboratory conditions required by the act.
There appears to be no statutory right given to the union to obtain
addresses and phone numbers of the employees. 124 Perhaps this would

or should constitute an undesirable violation of privacy. Thus the
ability to contact employees, as in the recently decided Gimbel
Bros.1 25 where the union was able to obtain less than half of the

addresses, will be seriously limited. Radio and TV cannot seriously
be viewed as having any comparative value.
Judge Clark has accurately summarized the problem in the recent
and important decision of NLRB v. United Aircraft:

The chances are negligible that alternatives equivalent to solicitation in the
plant itself would exist ....
The solicitors have no opportunity for personal
confrontation so that they can present their message with maximum
persuasiveness. In contrast the predictable alternatives bear without excep-

tion the flaws of greater expense and effort, and a lower degree of effectiveness. Mailed material would be typically lost in the daily flood of printed
matter which passes with little impact from mailbox to waste basket.
Television and radio appeals where not precluded entirely by cost, would
120. See Note, 65 YALE L. J. 423 (1956).
121. This does not mean that the Board, where other alternatives are not available,
will not recognize the importance of union access to company-owned homes occupied
by the workers. See Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1963). Cf.
NLRB v. Lake Superior, 167 F.2d 147 (6th Cir. 1948).

122. See 61 YALE L.J. 1066, supra note 59, at 1074, 1076.
123. 140 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1963).
124. See Excelsior Underwear Inc., Case No. 11-RC 1876 (1964). Cf. NLRB
v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 277 F.2d 758 (5th Cir. 1960), upholding the right of
employees to obtain addresses during working time.
125. 147 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 56 L.R.R.M. 1287 (1964).
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suffer from competition with the family's favorite programs and, at best,
would not compare with personal solicitation. Newspaper advertisements are
subject to similar suppressions. Sidewalks and street comers are subject
to vicissitudes of climate, and often force solicitation at such awkward times,
as when employees are hurrying to and from work.1 6

Since Steelworkers is a step beyond Babcock in requiring "effective"
communication for the union, the Supreme Court could logically
concur, in another case to come, with the Second Circuit's practickl
interpretation of what is effective. But as will be pointed out, such
concurrence will require some hard swallowing of previous abhorrences for per se rules. One of the most dismaying aspects of the
above mentioned rule is, as the Second Circuit noted,127 the endless
litigation that results. The parties are rarely sure of their rights and
a hostile employer will nearly always refuse to admit the organizer.
It may be much better from his standpoint to litigate and then, at
the hearing, list the media available to the union. From the union's
standpoint, the doctrine can be confronted only with subterfuge.
If the union seeks to obtain every possible media and spends a large
amount of money in doing so, the employer will say that a finding of
a violation is an attempt to insure success for the union. 12s A dilemma
is thus posed for the union. It must, in its own interest, do the best
campaigning possible but, at the same time, convince the Board
that such campaigning is worthless. It is not reasonable to assume
that the union will act against its own interests in either situation.
It is reasonable to assume that the union will do its best in both
situations and thus deprecate and minimize the extent of its own
activity. This temptation of perjury makes it more appropriate to
place the burden of proof in this matter on the employer, as will
often happen in practice, and thus require evidence from the party
whose interest it will serve. 12
In the light of Steelworkers, this burden for the employer is quite
logical. Although it is often overlooked, Steelworkers indicates that
opportunities for reaching employees with a pro-union message must
be, at a minimum, equal to those of the employer. 130 The Court said
that Where opportunities "are at least as great as the employer's
ability to promote legally authorized expression of his anti-union
views, there is no basis for invalidating these 'otherwise valid'
rules."131 In keeping with the Court's ad hoc approach, one cannot
126. 324 F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964).
127. Id. at 130.
128. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 295, 299 (1951): "the unions'

success in overcoming this impediment is not dispositive."
129. Cf. General Dynamics, 137 N.L.R.B. 1725, 1728 (1962).
130. See Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1243, 1258 (1963).
131. Steelworkers, supra note 84, at 364.
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say that opportunities that are less than equal will always result in
an unfair practice. The important factor is that the presumption,
to the extent that one can speak of presumptions under Steelworkers,
should shift at least so as to place a burden of proof upon the
employer. 32 Nevertheless one must draw back from speaking about
presumptions in this context. For it seems clear that if the NLRB
General Counsel does not introduce evidence concerning other media,
an employer would be on sound grounds in moving to dismiss on
the pleadings. This is a part of the General Counsel's case which
he must come forward with in order to have the charge of an unfair
133
labor practice sustained.
However, the Board and courts should recognize the great difficulties that the Babcock criteria impose upon the General Counsel.
Investigation of what media the union could or did use will inevitably
turn upon the financial resources at hand. But it would be a terrible
mistake to get involved with this factor as it will not answer the
important questions. Union financial resources are, generally speaking,
very plentiful. It is also true that not enough of these resources
have been employed in organizational campaigns and for this the
unions only can be blamed. However, the Board should not concern
itself with this interesting sidelight. It is now charged with ascertaining the effectiveness of media in each particular case. This is
entirely separate from and irrelevant to the union's financial abilities
to purchase radio and television time.
The Board should accept evidence of the existence of alternate
routes of communication. If, as normally seems to be the case, the
union does not have the addresses of all employees and, more
important, cannot readily obtain an audience of most of the workers
on, for instance a television program or at a meeting, the Board
should hold that the alternatives are not effective enough to constitute meaningful equality. Paradoxically, insofar as radio and television
are concerned, this might require the company town setting, or
something very similar, and one station which would in fact reach
a small number of people who are not diverted by competing entertainment. I do not believe that one can seriously speak of adequate
or effective communication where the union must go to the workers,
132. See Note, 64 CoLum. L. REv. 780, 785 (1964).
133. After a charge of an unfair labor practice has been filed, the Regional Director
of the Board may issue a complaint "if it appears . . . that formal proceedings in
respect thereto should be instituted .... ." A hearing is then held before a Trial
Examiner of the Board and the rules of evidence applicable to the district courts of
the United States "so far as practicable" will be used. Upon issuance of a decision
by the Trial Examiner the case is transferred to Washington where any party may
take exception to the decision, record and proceedings. See NLRB Rules and Regulations and Statements of Procedure § 8, as amended, 2-16 (1962).
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through any means, who are spread out in the cities, suburbs or
rural areas. The union is put to a hollow gesture when it must
compete over television in, for instance, the New York-New Jersey
area for the votes of a very small portion of that population. All
of this the Board must take into account, even though in so doing
it may imitate the approach taken by the Second Circuit in United
Aircraft and thus risk the ire of those yet adhering to Steelworkers.
Practically speaking, the Board would simply list other media without
articulating the presumption in which it must indulge.
It is indeed amazing that the Steelworkers opinion contains the
implicit assumption that, more often than not, or even half of the
time, the union will have available communications that are "at least"
equal. It would be difficult to envisage many organizational struggles
where the union's extra-plant communications were superior to those
of the employer. Surely this was not lost on the Court in both
Babcock and Steelworkers where the union is denied at least in some
instances, what everyone, including the Court, recognizes as the most
effective media, the plant itself. Is it really possible to assume that
the union has equality and possibly more, without the use of the
plant?
In May Department Stores,1 4 the Board held that inequality or
an "imbalance" was to be presumed in retail department stores and
thus required the employer to accede to a union request to reply to a
captive audience speech on company time and property. Most certainly Babcock and Steelworkers do not, as the May majority asserts,
"require" the arrived at result.135 To begin with, Steelworkers
does
not necessarily subscribe to even the Second Circuit version of
Bonwit in finding presumptively, that retail department stores with
broad no-solicitation rules present an "imbalance." Steelworkers cites
Bonwit and the similar concurring opinion in Woolworth by way of
comparison if anything, to the Babcock criterion. It is correct for
the Board to say that the no-solicitation rule in May is broader than
those presented in Steelworkers.136 But Steelworkers is a blow for the
ad hoc approach. And, as the dissent of Member Rodgers and the
Sixth Circuit's May opinion (in which the Board was reversed) 137
state, the Board did not conduct an evaluation of opportunities related solely to the facts set forth in May, but rather characterized
them as "catch-as-catch-can methods of rebuttal."' 38 The Board's
answer must be, in part, that these channels are unreal and, to the
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

136 N.L.R.B. 797 (1962).
Id. at 800.
Id. at 800-02.
May Dep't Stores v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963).
Id. at 801-02.
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extent that they are susceptible of investigation, incapable of evaluation on an ad hoc basis, especially when compared to the employer
captive audience. This Board analysis of the facts of life, an assessment
that will not normally be otherwise, might obtain a better reception
now that the Court seems more inclined to accept the Board's presumptions concerning industrial relations. 139
May follows the Steelworkers equality of communications thesis,
but qualified in a manner so as to carefully rebut a potential and
perhaps justifiable Supreme Court assertion that Steelworkers has
been misread. Thus the May opinion analyzes Steelworkers as a requirement of "balance." In addition to the varying interpretations
that can be drawn from that word, the Board, because May involves
a department store where workers are "uniquely handicapped,"' 4
is able to find a "glaring imbalance" in organizational opportunities.
Perhaps this is out of acknowledgement of the Court's words in
another portion of Steelworkers which speak of imbalance of a "considerable degree."
In any event, the question of equality or even balance is avoided
in May. But when the Board meets the normal factory situation with
ordinary solicitation rules, which it expressly declined to comment on
in May,141 it will by necessity risk more in the way of interpretation.'4 In such a case the Board must, on its facts, meet the question
139. See, e.g., NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
140. Marshall Field, 98 N.L.R.B. 88, modified, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952); and
see Montgomery Ward & Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 130 (1965), wherein the Board
refused to apply the May doctrine in a department store with no-solicitation rules
applicable only to non-working time. Here, however, the Board might have found
a violation and yet avoided the Livingston Shirt issue because of two factors present
in this case. One is that the locality prohibited the distribution of literature on public
streets and thus precluded union distribution at employee entrances. This should
weight the balance against union communication in what is, according to the Board's
own rationale, an important area. Second, the rule was not announced or publicized
to employees. Although the employer adhered to the rule in regard to employees who
solicited for the union, the failure to articulate it could have an inhibitory effect on
union action. See notes 194 and 195 infra and cases cited therein. On the other hand,
not only was solicitation permitted on non-working time but also non-employee
organizers were permitted to solicit, under reasonable rules, in "public" areas. The
organizers were not, however, permitted to distribute literature. See also S. Klein Department Stores, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 49, 57 L.R.R.M. 1321 (1964), wherein the Board
applied the Babcock criteria and did not find a violation where a non employee
organizer was ejected from a retail store parking lot.
141. May, supra note 137, at 800 n.11: "It is not necessary to, and we do not pass
upon the Livingston Shirt case insofar as it affects non-department store situations."
But see Atlantic Mills Servicing Co., 8 RD-235 (1962), wherein the Board affirmed
the Regional Director's failure to extend May to the industrial establishment in a
representation case. See also McCulloch Corp. Case No. 21, R.C. 8228 (1964).
142. It might be possible to argue that because one of the Livingston Shirt exceptions exists where there is an "unlawful broad no-solicitation. xul (prohibiting union
access to company premises on other than working time)" an employer must afford
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of balance and perhaps, with a mind for enforcement in the courts,
clarify its meaning. That would be the leap at the precipice. For
unless the Board decides to adhere to the Court's ad hoc approach,
and evaluate each case on the basis of its own facts (attempting to
explain how this is done) 143 it must utilize the dreaded per se

rules.144 One defense-and a weak one at that-would be that StoddardQuirk now limits Steelworkers to distribution problems. This is im-

plausible in light of the May opinion (although the Board has subsequently characterized May as "oral solicitation" as against "distribu-

tion"'145 ) and the presence of solicitation in Avondale Mills.
The only escape would have been for the Board to distinguish
Steelworkers from May on the basis of a "captive audience" in May.

But in any event that is now too late. A resuscitation of the Board's
Bonwit Teller doctrine which the Board already claims to approve of
in May, will require conflict with Steelworkers on the ad hoc question.
A defense for May would be that as Babcock exculpates from its
sweep those exceptions to the rule, such as lumber camps, 146 so also
are retail department stores to be reasonably viewed as one of the

exceptions. But since Steelworkers sets up the higher standard of
equality and "effective" communications, the unions could expect
that the quid pro quo is the ad hoc approach and the sacrifice of
any implied interpretations of Babcock. Of course, the Board, in
May could be interpreting "other distribution" to mean employer
action. 147 Yet, once again it is reasonable to assume that the Steelthe union a reply where non-employees are excluded from company premises. However, Babcock seems to counter this argument.
Thus Member Rodgers would appear to be correct in asserting that Livingston
Shirt, as it preceded Babcock, did not contemplate a distinction between employees
and non-employees. See May, supra note 134, at 806 n.25.
143. This is not to say that no case can yield facts which are capable of evaluation. Thus, for instance, in a large metropolitan area employees in a small plant
(numbering perhaps 30-40) could not be reached-effectively or otherwise-by radio
or television media.
144. The Fourth Circuit has, in Wellington Mill Division v. NLRB, 330 F.2d
579, 589-90 (4th Cir. 1964), accepted the opposite presumption. Within the context
of a discharge arising out of disparate enforcement of a no-solicitation rule, the
Court wrote the following: "we are of the opinion that, generally, an employer may
not be held to have been acting discriminatorily in distributing antiunion literature
and otherwise engaging in antiunion solicitation while at the same time enforcing a
rule prohibiting activities on the part of its prounion employees which disrupt regular
work schedules and interfere with production . . . [citing Steelworkers]. Implicit in
the Supreme Court's holding in this regard is the proposition that an employer may,
without being charged with discrimination, discharge employees who violate a valid
no-solicitation rule while concurrently sanctioning the distribution of antiunion material.
Were it otherwise, the employer would be powerless to enforce the rule."
145, Stoddard-Quirk, supra note 17, at 618 n.4.
146. Babcock, supranote 83, at 111.
147. May, supra note, 134, at 802: "While it is true that the Supreme Court in
Babcock & Wilcox held that an employer may normally put a union to the task of
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workers ad hoc approach supercedes anything that Babcock might
have meant by "other distribution." Moreover, because the Board
in the subsequent paragraph of May speaks of effectiveness in communication, one is tempted to think that Steelworkers occupies primary attention and that in considering the problems of employer
affirmative conduct we must now look to Steelworkers rather than
Babcock.
The difficulty is that adherence to Steelworkers on this point requires a departure from the Republic theory which, as we have seen,
seems to be accepted in Bonwit. This conflict must be resolved by the
Supreme Court.
In this writer's opinion the great importance of May lies in its
most articulate answer to certain assumptions implicit in Babcock
and Steelworkers. It must be remembered that the Court in Babcock
affirmed judgments in the Fifth148 and Tenth Circuits 49 premised
in large part upon an assumed divergence of interest between union
and employee. In prophetic anticipation, perhaps, of the philosophical underpinnings of section 8(b) (7),150 the Fifth Circuit for instance,
noted that "no employee is involved, no employee is complaining
and no rights of employees have been involved or abridged."''
Justice Frankfurter's Steelworkers opinion reflects the same turn of
mind. Ironically, the statute requires that employees have the benefit
12
of the outside union representative as part of the duty to bargain.
Thus the workers with the established relationship have, so to speak,
a preferred position through their right to "outside counsel." This
right of the workers takes on a synthetic value which is increasingly
exaggerated if it cannot be utilized at the place of work. 5 3 The
retort that, unlike the employees in Babcock, they have a previously
demonstrated interest in unionism, while only a qualified truth, misunderstands the real facts of organizational campaigns. A demonstrated interest, in any formal or legal sense of the word, means
organizing employees through such channels, it indicated that such right was not
absolute, but was limited to those circumstances, where the effectiveness of such
channels of communication was not diminished by employer conduct or by other
circumstances." (Emphasis added.)
148. NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 222 F.2d 316 (5th Cir. 1955), reversing 109
N.L.R.B. 485 (1954); cf. Monsanto Chem. Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 1110 (1954), rev'd,
225 F.2d 16 (9th Cir. 1955).
149. NLRB v. Seamprufe, Inc., 222 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1955), reversing 109
N.L.R.B. 24 (1954).
150. Supra, note 2. The provision was intended by some to combat "blackmail"
picketing through which corrupt unions could coerce employers into signing union
contracts without employee participation. Benefits and dues did not always balance
out equitably. See Cox, LAw AND Tm NATiONAL LA3OR PoLicy 20-47 (1960).
151. Babcock, supra note 83, at 319.
152. E.g., Fafnir Bearing Company, 146 N.L.R.B. No. 179, 56 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1964).
153. Note, 65 YALE L.J. 423, 427 (1956).

1964 ]

UNION ACTIVITY ON COMPANY PROPERTY

exposure to threats and retaliation' 54 and perhaps more important, an
early employer campaign to diminish such interest. Such a doctrine
would require some of the pro-unionism that the organizer hopes to
obtain before he has the chance to obtain it. It would be preferable,
as has been suggested elsewhere, 55 to presume the interest unless
there is a showing to the contrary.
May, then, relates the union-employee interests in terms of access
to company property, so as to answer effectively the problems raised
in Babcock:
The normal effectiveness of such channels stems not alone from the ability
of a union to make contact with employees, away from their place of work,
but also from the availability of normal opportunities to employees to
discuss the matter with fellow employees at their place of work. The place
of work is that one place where all employees involved are sure to be
together. Thus it is the one place where they can all discuss with each
other the advantages and disadvantages of organization and lend each other
support and encouragement. Such full discussion lies at the very heart of
the organizational rights guaranteed by the Act, and it is not to be restricted except as the exigencies of production, discipline and order demand.
It is only where opportunities for such discussion are available, limited, of
course, by the need to maintain production, order and discipline, that the
election procedures established in the Act can be expected to produce
the peaceful resolution of representation questions on the basis of a free
and informed choice. Where such discussion is not allowed, the normal
channels of communication become clogged and lose their effectiveness.
In such circumstances, the balance in 'opportunities for organizational communication' is destroyed by an employer's utilization of working time and
place for its antiunion campaign. 5

It is obvious that much of this dictum goes beyond the Steelworkers situation and really to a pure Babcock problem without
employer conduct. This is perhaps what distracted the Sixth Circuit's
May opinion, a decision that is classic for its misapplication of the

rules of law. 57 The Sixth Circuit reversed the Board and instead of
relying on the grounds available to them under Steelworkers, held

that Babcock "puts the union to the use of methods of communication other than contact on the employer's premises if other means
are available to the union." Even assuming that Babcock does not
contemplate employer action by "other distribution" (as the Sixth
Circuit undoubtedly believes) any protection for the employer is
superceded here by Steelworkers. Even if the Sixth Circuit is correct
154. See Administration of the Labor-Management Act by the NLRB, 87th Cong.,

Ist Sess. (1961).
155. Supra, note 151, at 429.

156. May, supranote 137, at 802.
157. May Department Stores v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 797 (6th Cir. 1963); see also
Note, 32 Foanssm L. REv. 378, 382 (1963).
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in its interpretation of Babcock and in its belief that that case is
the controlling one, Steelworkers' characterization of section 8(c),
upon which the Sixth Circuit's decision is ultimately based, contradicts the qualified analysis of the proviso enunciated by Justice
Frankfurter. Once again, the only defense would be StoddardQuirk's finite differentiation of media. Besides being a weak argument, the Court's opinion affords little evidence that this theory is
being relied on. Stoddard-Quirk is not cited. Here of course the
citation would work to the court's disadvantage due to the higher
status accorded solicitation in that case and the comparison of less
stringent standards for the captive audience set forth in Steelworkers.
Curiously, the Sixth Circuit's view of section 8(c) is the one
articulated by Chief Justice Warren in his Steelworkers dissent. We
must hope that that Court does not become prey to a related portion
of the dissent. The opportunity will be presented to them shortly in
58
the appeal of Montgomery Ward & Co."
In Montgomery Ward the Board was presented with a department
store situation with broad no-solicitation rules and a similar preelection speech on company time and property. The Board "respectfully" disagreeing with the Sixth Circuit, held that "in order
to allow a proper balance to be maintained," the company must
accede to a union request for reply. A violation of section 8(a) (1)
was found and the election set aside. But here, as in Avondale Mills,
the company had committed an independent violation of the act,
thus, the Board said, creating a glaring imbalance "here more than
in May." This, of course, is the crucial distinction relied upon in the
Steelworkers dissent. 5 9 If the Sixth Circuit should reach for this bit
158. 145 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 55 L.R.R.M. 1063 (1964). Regrettably, the Sixth
Circuit appears to have followed the very approach warned against herein subsequent
to completion of this article. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 58 L.R.R.M. 2115
(6th Cir. 1965).
159. Two separate violations have been found where employer circulation of withdrawal slips violated an otherwise valid rule in NLRB v. Hill & Hill Truck Line,
266 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1959), affinning 120 N.L.R.B. 101 (1958); Standard Mfg.
Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 56 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1964); Atlantic Paper Co., 121 N.L.R.B.
125 (1958); Air Control Prods. Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 607 (1962); cf. Hydes Super
Mkt., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 122, 55 L.R.R.M. 1143 (1964); W. R. Hall Distrib., 144
N.L.R.B. No. 123, 54 L.R.R.M. 1231 (1963); Hawkins Container Co., 145 N.L.R.B.
No. 62, 55 L.R.R.M. 1020 (1963); Radio Kemental Indus. Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 62,
54 L.R.R.M. 1106 (1963); United Biscuit Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1552 (1952), aft'd,
208 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1953); Nebraska Bag Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 654 (1958); General
Marine Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 1395 (1958); Hurd Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. No. 29, 53
L.R.R.M. 1383 (1963); Red Rock Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 521 (1949); Hexton Furniture
Co., 111 N.L.R.B. 342 (1955); Wix Corp., 140 N.L.R.B. 924 (1963); Brown Transport,
140 N.L.R.B. 954 (1963); Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 151, 54
L.R.R.M. 1296 (1963); S. H. Kxess & Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1244 (1962). But see
Perkins Machine Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 697 (1963), wherein employer solicitation through
revocation cards was not violative of the act where they were distributed in contempla-
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of allurement, they will enunciate an unfortunate and, at best, unimportant rule. In this type of case the Court could simply prohibit
what is unlawful under previously existing law without any reference
to a union reply. There can be a new election and a cease and desist
order on the basis of the independent violation which is, in itself,
unrelated to the union's right to reply. But the really incongruous
aspect of the Montgomery Ward-Avondale Mills approach is that the
remedy must be framed in alternatives-one of which is an unlawful
act.160 The entire theory is best forgotten.
The above conflict between Republic and Steelworkers, which
must permeate all discussion of this subject, has presented itself
clearly in post Steelworkers cases involving employees-especially
without an employer violation of his valid rule. In Time-O-Matic v.
NLRB,' 6 1 the Seventh Circuit held that Republic was still the law
and that "the Steelworkers case involved an admittedly valid nosolicitation rule and a very narrow question of whether an employer
who actively engaged in anti-union solicitation could properly enforce
an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule against the union."62 But in
NLRB v. Rockville Manufacturing,'-3 the Third Circuit held that
the governing criteria in all cases concerning employees were those
set forth in Babcock. The Third Circuit inverted the presumptions
and said that the charging party had the burden of proof where
Republic had made the same rule bad per se. The court, as if by
concession, stated that the Board was also obliged to consider evidence concerning the possibility of employee anti-union literature
at the same time. This points up the fallacy inherent in General
Dynamics and perhaps any disjunctive reading of Babcock. The
anomaly of other interpretations, as the Third Circuit seems to sense,
is the preferred position accorded anti-union activity.
In NLRB v. United Aircraft,'6 the Second Circuit dealt with the
same issue. Because of its direct frontal attack on the Babcock
criteria and, more important, the Steelworkers characterization of
Republic in that respect, this case assumes great importance. Judge
Clark, writing for the court, took direct issue with Steelworkers by
citing the dissent's analysis of Republic rather than that of the majority
tion of the escape period provided for in the maintenance of membership contract
between the parties.
160. Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 88, 55 L.R.R.M. 1063
(1964); Avondale Mills & Textile Workers Union of America, AFL-CIO, 115 N.L.R.B.
840 (1956).
161. 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959), affirming 121 N.L.R.B. 179 (1958).
162. Id. at 100.
163. 271 F.2d 109 (3rd Cir. 1959), reversing 121 N.L.R.B. 288 (1958).
164. Supra note 126, affirming 139 N.L.R.B. 39 (1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
951 (1964). See in this regard Note, 64 COLUm. L. REV. 780 (1964).
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which was dismissed as a "passing reference." If the court had
applied Steelworkers, they would have had to require a request of
employees in the face of a Board holding that an employer cannot
"predicate the exercise of a section 7 right upon its own authorization."16 5 Thus the court, in United Aircraft, distinguished Steelworkers in a manner similar to that of Time-O-Matic: "We cannot
read the Court's dictum as erasing the important qualifications established in Republic that no such showing was required where employees alone were involved." 166
On this point the Second Circuit is at the heart of the matter.
As mentioned before, Steelworkers criteria-both request and alternate
communications-were previously applicable only to non-employees. 16 7
Although there is a possibility that the Supreme Court did not fully
understand this, Steelworkers involved only employees.168 In W. T.
Grant Co.169 the Board 70 held, in a discharge case, that an employer
violated the Act when a no-solicitation rule was "unfairly and discriminatorily applied" between pro-union and anti-union employees.
This is very much in accord with' previous Board law' 7 ' and skirts
the Steelworkers question as it does not involve the employer directly.
But in Wellington Mill Division7 2 a question more directly concern165. J. R. Simplot, 137 N.L.R.B. 1552 (1962); contra, NLRB v. Shawnee Indus.,
Inc., 333 F.2d 221 (10th Cir. 1964). In support of the former case see most recently
Aerodex, Inc., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 57 L.R.R.M. 1261 (1964); East Texas Steel
Castings Company, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 121 (1965); Jas. H. Matthews & Co., 149
N.L.R.B. No. 18, 57 L.R.R.M. 1253 (1964); Yale & Towne, Inc., No. 26-CA-1706,
Trial Examiner's Decision, August 31, 1964.
See also Edmont Mfg., 139 N.L.R.B. 1528 (1962); Mayrath Co., 132 N.L.R.B. 1628
(1961), aff'd, 319 F.2d 424 (7th Cir. 1963), wherein the Board has held that, insofar
as insignia is concerned, it is the employer who must come forward and inform the
employees as to the reason behind his request that they remove insignia. Cf. Gallagher
Drug Co., 116 N.L.R.B. 1263 (1956); Miller Elec. Mfg. Co., 120 N.L.R.B. 298, 313
(1958); Young Spring & Wire Corp. 138 N.L.R.B. 643 (1962).
166. NLRB v. United Aircraft, supra note 126, at 132.
167. See the dissenting opinion of Member Leedom in May, supra note 134, at 808
n.33: "Although Nutone involved the rights of employees its principles, insofar as
they preclude a finding of violation, apply a fortiori to nonemployees." See NLRB
v. Babcock & Wilcox, supra note 83.
168. See Biltmore Mfg. Co., 97 N.L.R.B. 905 (1951), wherein an employee
requested an opportunity to reply to a captive audience speech. The Board noted the
stronger case presented because of this factor.
169. 136 N.L.R.B. 152 (1962), rev'd on factual grounds, 315 F.2d 83 (9th Cir.
1963).
170. Chairman McCullough and Member Leedom did not participate in W. T. Grant.
171. Armstrong Cork Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1341 (1954); Grand Cent. Aircraft, Inc.,
103 N.L.R.B. 1114, (1953); Goodall Co., 86 N.L.R.B. 814 (1949); Merrimac Hat
Corp., 85 N.L.R.B. 329 (1949); Allen-Morrison Sign Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 904 (1948);
Macon Textiles Inc., 80 N.L.R.B. 1525 (1948). Cf. Phillips Control Corp., 129
N.L.R.B. 1485 (1961); Franchester Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1391 (1954); General
Motors Corp., 73 N.L.R.B. 74 (1947).
172. 141 N.L.R.B. 819 (1963), reversed, 330 F.2d 579 (4th Cir. 1964).
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ing employer conduct was presented to the Board. In Wellington,
an employer had a no-solicitation rule banning any person from
engaging in "union organization during working hours." The employer
distributed literature during working hours and fired an employee
who brought pro-union sections of this literature to the attention of
other workers-also during working time. The Trial Examiner found
a violation through disparate application of the rule. The Board,
however, avoided this issue and held that the rule was a mere
"pretext." This is probably a sound conclusion but that finding does
not excuse avoiding the real issue-application of the rule. The Board
wrote the following: "[since] there was no actual application and
enforcement of the no-solicitation rule against McKinney, there is
no basis for the Trial Examiner's finding that the rule was disparately
applied and enforced against him in violation of the Act." 3
However, Member Rodgers, in dissent, viewed Wellington as indistinguishable from Steelworkers in that here again the employer
utilized what was, according to the dissent, a perfectly lawful
prerogative. Subsequently the Fourth Circuit adopted Member
Rodgers' dissent 1 4 though it refused to consider the rule at issue.
In Wellington the Board seems to approach the Steelworkers problem with much trepidation. Of course, here the rule itself is not
challenged in that the cease and desist order is meant to cure the
unlawful discharge and not a general pattern of discrimination. But
one is able to appreciate the evasiveness of Wellington if, at the same
time, the perils of applying May to the normal plant situation, which
have been mentioned earlier, are properly understood.
It is indeed anomalous that W. T. Grant should be the setting in
which the trade unionist gets redress, while in Wellington, where
the employer brings pressure to bear which must, by the nature of
his position, have a more deleterious effect on self-organization, the
worker cannot be sure of his protection. The same can be said for
a comparison of United Aircraft and Steelworkers. It does not make
sense for the worker to have more liberty when the employer does
not act than when the employer does campaign. Even Steelworkers,
in embroidering on Babcock, seems to have recognized that truism.
173. Id. at 820. The Board has exhibited extreme reluctance to characterize any
solicitation during working hours as protected and concerted activity. See Aladdin
Indus. Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 167, p. 2, n.2., 56 L.R.R.M. 1388 (1964). Cf. Daniel
Constr. Co., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 130, 55 L.R.R.M. 1162 (1964); Story Oldsmobile, Inc.,
140 N.L.R.B. 1049 (1963); Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1959); I. C.
Sutton Handle Factory, 119 N.L.R.B. 951 (1957), aff'd, 255 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1958);
Milwaukee Elec. Tool Corp., 112 N.L.R.B. 1135 (1955), rev'd, 237 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.
1956).
174. Wellington Mills Div. v. NLRB, supra note 172. But see NLRB v. Overnite Transp. Co., 308 F.2d 284, 290 (4th Cir. 1962).
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Surely common sense dictates that the worker must have more freedom to act when the employer does so. One would think that any
court which invokes a rule concerning access or communication
would premise, in part, its reasoning upon the quantum of pressure
brought to bear by both parties. But the law today does not seem
concerned with the emergence of common sense. There is a legal
fixation with section 8(c) as an absolute principle and an uncalled
for restriction on the use of that proviso for the employer alone.
In Gimbel Bros.17 5 the Board has indicated that it will not go
beyond the saving operation conducted in Wellington. StoddardQuirk would appear to make Gimbel Bros. distinguishable from May
even though both cases arise in the department store context. The
no-distribution rule in Gimbel Bros. which affects both working and
non-working time in "working areas" cannot be viewed as broad and
privileged-thus there is less need to remedy an imbalance. However,
the concurrence here of Stoddard-Quirk dissenters makes it possible
that this is not the prime, or at least only, consideration. Of course,
Gimbel Bros. presented other factors which argue for the union
handicap in self-organization which the Board has found in department stores. On the other hand, the no-solicitation rule was not
drawn as widely as Board rules permit.
It may be quite difficult to appreciate the considerations that persuaded a unanimous Board to find no violation and not to set the
election aside in Gimbel Bros. One might rely upon the opinion's
concern with the failure of the union or the employees to request
equal distribution rights. The citation of James Hotel Co., 176 where
employees made no request to answer captive audience addresses,
may well signify a determination to reject complaints which involve
employees claiming rights under the Republic theory. Thus, the lack
of non-employee organizers and the issuance of a consequent request
would seem to be the great distinguishing characteristic in both
Gimbel Bros. and James Hotel. It should be pointed out that captive
audience sessions were undertaken by the employer in both cases,
although the Board took little note of this factor in the former case.
I do not think that the failure of the Gimbel Bros. opinion to discuss
the captive audience can argue for differentiation on this basis from
May. It is true that the captive audience presents a unique situation
which should be arguably viewed as sui generis and, as the Board
said in Metropolitan Auto Parts, unrelated to the no-solicitation rule.
But as already mentioned, May has surrendered this approach despite
175. 147 N.L.R.B. No. 62, 56 L.R.R.M. 1287 (1964); cf. Stoddard-Quirk, supra
note 17, at 618 n.4; Beiser Aviation Corp., 135 N.L.R.B. 399 (1962).
176. 142 N.L.R.B. 761 (1963).
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the special comparison drawn to captive audience cases in Steelworkers. Further analysis of the pros and cons of the captive audience
in May and literature distribution in Gimbel Bros. makes for a rather
unsatisfactory situation.
May and Gimbel Bros. can be compared in diverse postures which,
as might be expected, will lead the observer to opposite conclusions.
From the employer's standpoint, it is probably worse to have production halted when the union gives a speech than to have employees
pass out handbills on working time-an activity which does not in
itself stop the enterprise. However, it is just possible that the latter
could be more harmful in a prolonged campaign than the more
dramatic (and perhaps volatile) but comparatively shorter union
rebuttal speech. The probable answer to this is the question posed
by Republic-is it possible for the employer himself to be harmed, to
any significant degree, when he is engaging in the same conduct.
On the other hand it is possible to argue that no-distribution rules
are less disadvantageous to the unions and the employees than nosolicitation rules and prohibitions on "union talk" and union replies
to employer speeches. That argument (conforming to the spirit of
Stoddard-Quirk) is extremely dependent upon how the advocate
frames it. It seems clear that the captive audience technique has a
greater, more telling impact on the worker-as perhaps motion
pictures do- 77 than employer handbilling. But May and Gimbel
Bros. do not arise in vacuo, but rather within the context of some
specific muscle flexing by the opposition. Countervailing power is
required for the immediate threat. And in Gimbel Bros. the theory
(which is often advanced in connection with the Stoddard-Quirk
rationale) that employees can be given literature just outside the
plant doors does not often hold true in department stores where the
union cannot distinguish customers from employees 1 78 and where
variegated work schedules force employees to come and go at any
time throughout the day. 79
Theories about what is more or less disadvantageous in these cases
do not seem realistic enough to command primary attention. But
then, this reasoning is premised upon the belief that Stoddard-Quirk
is good law. Gimbel Bros. points up in part, the tenuous reasoning
of the former case.
Finally, one is forced to rationalize Gimbel Bros. and James Hotel
177. Cf. Plochman & Harrison-Cherry Lane Foods, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 130 (1962).

178. This assumes that the union campaign does not consist of advising the public
about the existence of an organizational campaign.
179. Marshall Field, supra note 140. See also Meier & Frank Co., 89 N.L.R.B.
1016 (1950); Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948). Cf. the dissenting opinion
of Members Houston and Styles, 89 N.L.R.B. 1016, at 1022 (1950).
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in terms of non-employees vis-6.-vis employees and the lack of request.
But this, as has been argued earlier, is incongruous in the light of
the relative weakness of employees without outside assistance and the
unrealistic notion that most workers will make procedurally correct
requests. Indeed, whether grounded upon Stoddard-Quirk considerations or those annotated above, the decisions in both cases, and
especially in Gimbel Bros. where the employer campaign was more
widespread and heavily fortified, are weak ones and a retreat from the
ideas propounded in May.
There is one further variant that flows from Steelworkers. It is
present in the Avondale Mills case and must have been, in part,
what the Court refers to in both cases as clear anti-union bias.
Avondale Mills contained a so-called unwritten, dormant no-solicitation rule which, according to the employer, had always existed.
In view of the Court's failure to suspect the good faith promulgation
of the Avondale rule, the Board's subsequent holding in Star-Brite
Industries'80 is not a surprising one. In that case the Board held
that a promulgation of a no-solicitation rule, for working hours, even
though oral and an on the spot pronouncement to one or two
employees, simultaneous with an organizational drive was not in
itself discriminatory. In this case Steelworkers was apparently interpreted in a manner similar to the Third Circuit's approach in Rockwell, as the rule concerning181employees only was not viewed as an
"unreasonable impediment"
to organization and thus was lawful.
Moreover, the Board noted that the decision could not be altered
because the rule did not embrace other types of solicitation. The
reasoning is somewhat reminiscent of the Livingston Shirt notion
that employers should not have to subsidize union organizing. "It
would be an anomaly to recognize that an employer may lawfully
adopt such a rule, yet to hold that he may not do so when the
occasion for its use arises." 82
The Board was not always consistent in its adherence to StarBrite183 and Member Fanning, who did not participate in the case,
admitted to a certain distrust for its rationale in a subsequent
dissent' 84 which did not present the exact same issue. The Star-Brite
180. NLRB v. New England Upholstery, 268 F.2d 590 (1st Cir. 1959); United
Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 252 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1958); 127 N.L.R.B. 1008
(1960); Haleyville Textile Co., 118 N.L.R.B. 1157 (1957).
181. Cf. Carolina Mirror Corp., 123 N.L.R.B. 1712 (1959).
182. Star-Brite, supra note 180, at 1011.
183. Compare Laub Baking, 131 N.L.R.B. 869 (1961), with New Orleans Furniture
Mfg. Co., 129 N.L.R.B. 244 (1960), and Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 129 N.L.R.B.
427 (1960).
184. See Midwestern Instruments, Inc., 131 N.L.R.B. 1026 (1961). (Chairman
McCulloch and Member Brown not participating). Member Fanning dissenting,
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rule incorporates three basic elements and it must be discussed
accordingly: (1) timing of a work hours rule simultaneous with the
union organization; (2) oral or on the spot promulgation which does
not necessarily contemplate a general rule of which all employees
have knowledge; (3) the background pattern and/or present existence
of "social" solicitation during working time. Star-Brite seems to say
that all three elements added together in the same case do not make
an otherwise valid rule unlawful.
As of this writing, Star-Brite has not been overruled. 184a But in reality something of d pincer movement has begun to form against that
case's assumptions and reasoning. In Memphis Publishing Co.,1'

it was held that an employer could not prohibit union activity during
work hours in retaliation for certain types, at least, of protected
activity. In this case the employer had previously permitted the
union to hold activities extending even to grievance hearings and
union elections during working time. This privilege was, however,
withdrawn when the union filed an unfair labor practice charge
against the employer. Such action in itself was held unlawful without
mention of Star-Brite. The holding can of course be limited to the
case's facts and thus be viewed as the basic protection which an
agency must provide in order that its administrative processes be
18 6
utilized effectively.
Perhaps a rule creating a presumptive violation on the basis of
timing alone would be unfair, but the matter of oral promulgation
is particularly insidious. This is even more arbitrary than a rule
which is vague and not specific enough to provide the average worker
with the forewarning that he should be entitled to as a basic matter
of due process. 187 To permit an employer suddenly to invoke a new

found, as opposed to the majority, that the Trial Examiner was correct in finding

an 8(a)(1) violation where a no-solicitation rule was interpreted by the parties
as applicable to coffee breaks: "Without passing on the merits of the Star-Brite
decision as applied to a presumptively valid no-solicitation rule, it is clear that it has
no application to the instant case." Id. at 1030. And further: "I find it difficult to
believe that the Star-Brite decision was intended to foreclose reliance on factors
which reinforce the presumption of invalidity of a rule that applies to nonworking
time." Id. at 1030 n.11. One must interpret the above adherence to a viewpoint which,
while not necessarily declaring rules invalid on the basis of timing alone, most certainly
considers it as an important factor in determining the rule's legality. Accord, NLRB
v. Linda Jo Shoe Co., 307 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1962).
184a. Subsequent to the completion of this article the Board, Member Leedom dissenting, has held in Win. H. Block Co., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 30, 57 L.R.R.M. 1531 (1964),
that the Star-Brite doctrine is, to some degree, overruled.
185. 133 N.L.R.B. 1435 (1961); accord, Cornell-Dubilier Corp. 111 N.L.R.B. 277
(1955); cf. Sinko Mfg. & Tool Co., 149 NLRB No. 21, 51 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1964).
186. Cf. Young Spring & Wire Corp., 138 N.L.R.B. 643, 654 (1962).
187. Florida Sugar Corp., 142 N.L.R.B. 460 (1963)- Ripley Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B.
No. 106, 54 L.R.R.M. 1202 (1963); Mitchell Concrete Prods. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 504
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or dormant rule against a union supporter, especially when, as so

often happens, a loose disciplinary system has been in existence, 188

smacks of elemental unfairness and illegality. Yet this is what StarBrite permits.
Subsequently, the Board seems to have repudiated the proposition
that oral promulgation to an employee is not suspect, but once again

without mentioning Star-Brite.189 The Ninth Circuit, however, re-

versed-partially on the basis of that case-and held that not only

was oral promulgation to an individual good but also that legitimate

misinterpretation of such a rule is no defense. 190 In view of the

elaborate definitions in Stoddard-Quirk, this dictum becomes nothing

short of catastrophic. Presumably, the Board will not accede to the

Ninth Circuit opinion.
The third aspect of Star-Brite is extremely important for purposes
of inquiry with regard to the first two. It would seem that the
Board, once again deviating from the Star-Brite philosophy, now
holds that an employer may "possibly" prohibit union activities
during working time, but that the rule's validity when orally enun-

ciated, is dependent upon its application in regard to non-union and,

of course, anti-union conduct.' 9'
In another case 9 2 the Board relied upon background evidence to

support a finding that promulgation and application of the rule was
unlawful. Here a rule had existed for ten years but was repeatedly
breached in practice in that baseball pools and gambling concerning
sports activities were conducted during work time. When union
(1962); Anderson-Rooney Operating Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 1480, 1491 (1961); Western
Corrugated Inc., 122 N.L.R.B. 1021 (1959).
188. This is most apt to be the case in an unorganized plant where a contractual
and more formal relationship that generally comes with unionization is lacking.
189. W. T. Grant, supra note 169, see especially the dissenting opinion of Member
Rodgers at 155.
190. NLRB v. W. T. Grant, supra note 169, at 83, 84: "Misunderstanding of this
rule by the employee does not protect the employee from discharge."
191. Baker Hotel of Dallas, Inc., 134 N.L.R.B. 524, 538-39 (1961), aff'd, 311 F.2d
528 (5th Cir. 1963). Accord, Southern Materials Co., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 2, 54 L.R.R.M.
1314 (1963); cf. Nachman Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 34, 54 L.R.R.M. 1068 (1963).
A similar inquiry into employer motivation will take place where the Board seeks to
reinstate a disehargee who engages in solicitation during working time. The existence
of an unlawfully broad rule may serve to help. See NLRB v. Idaho Potato
Processors, 322 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1963); Mira Pak Inc., 47 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 56
L.R.R.M. 1355 (1964); Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949);
R.E.D.M. Corp., No. 22-CA-1743, Trial Examiner's Decision August 26, 1964. But see
Wah Chang Corp. v. NLRB, 305 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1962); NLRB v. Empire Mfg.
Corp., 260 F.2d 528 (4th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. William Davies Co., 135 F.2d 179
(7th Cir. 1943).
192. Revere Camera Co., 133 N.L.R.B. 1658 (1961), aff'd, 304 F.2d 162, 165
(7th Cir. 1962): "The basis for the rule is an employer's rightful concern over production and discipline-not a right of the employer to aid the objective of those employees
opposing union representation."
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organization began at the plant, union solicitation during work hours
was prohibited. The employer's countenancing of anti-union petitions
at the same time, however, make this case an exaggerated example.
and thus distinguishable from the normal Star-Brite case.. But in
adopting the trial examiner's findings, the Board placed much reliance on the above mentioned activities. This approach would
appear inconsistent with the Star-Brite assumption that union activity
is all that an employer would be interested in prohibiting and the
degraded value of section 7 rights implicit therein. While Star-Brite
does not specifically preclude background evidence of other solicita19 3
tion, its subsequent application supports such an interpretation.
Indeed it is also evident that the Board is returning to its pre-StarBrite rule' 94 and invalidating rules, or more normally the utilization
of such rules, pertaining to working time when other "special" solicitation is countenanced at the same time.195 This is undoubtedly the
meaning of the Board's recent comment that rules timed with union
organization, though not unlawful under Star-Brite, would be unlawful in a "proper case." 196
There will be cases where evidence that the employer has, in the
past or perhaps the present, permitted non-union solicitation should
not constitute an unlawful practice. For instance, it is quite unreasonable to compare an occasional charitable solicitation with the
havoc that could be created by union activity during working time.
Such a pattern should not, in itself, tie an employer's hands in regulating organizational efforts so as to protect production. The existence
of gambling pools and sports discussion presents a closer case.
Although this can be conducted in a most orderly manner in orga193. Supra, note 184.
194. Olin Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1951); Old King Cole,
Inc., 117 N.L.R.B. 297 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 250 F.2d 791 (6th Cir. 1958);
Jacques Power Saw Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 440 (1949); Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85
N.L.R.B. 1358 (1949).
195. Mira Pak, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 56 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1964); Standard
Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. No. 169, 56 L.R.R.M. 1445 (1964); Sweetwater Rug Co., 148
N.L.R.B. No. 54, 57 L.R.R.M. 1061 (1964); Ripley Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 106,
54 L.R.R.M. 1202 (1963); Elias Bros. Big Boy, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1057 (1962),
modified, 325 F.2d 360 (6th Cir. 1963); Idaho Potato Processors, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B.
910 (1962), affd, 322 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1963); see Canada Dry Corp. No. 1-CA4427 Trial Examiner's Decision, July 10, 1964, wherein it was held that a discharge
was a violation of the act where employer motivation rested on "unauthorized" use
of the bulletin board and where no such rule was found to be in existence prior to the
discharge; see also Conso Fastener Corp., 120 N.L.R.B. 532, 544 (1958); George C.
Knight Co., 102 N.L.R.B. 1198 (1953); Ford Radio & Mica Corp. 115 N.L.R.B. 1046
(1956), rev'd on other grounds, 258 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1958); Glen Raven Silk Mills,
Inc., 101 N.L.R.B. 239 (1952), modified, 203 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1953).
196. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 132 N.L.R.B. 612 (1961); cf. Threads, Inc., 132 N.L.R.B.
451 (1961).
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nized plants197 such may not always be the case where the employment
relationship is less well regulated. Employee passions can run high
in this area although an employer would be correct in asserting that
union discussion can have a more sustained and seriously argumentative effect among workers. Nevertheless, for the purpose of these
cases it would be proper to view these categories as roughly analogous
and thus place a burden on the employer who has permitted sports
activity and then promulgated an otherwise valid rule simultaneous
with the union's advent. Certainly this principle should be applied
in isolated discharge cases not involving the rule itself. This is
where the practical needs of employees, much more than legal theory,
require thorough examination of employer motivation. Of course
the employer could, when the occasion demands, present facts specifically pointing out the disorder that was resulting from union
activity as distinguished from other types of solicitation.
Insofar as timing itself is concerned, the trend marked out by Memphis Publishing would appear to be preferable to Star-Brite, although
as previously noted, Memphis Publishing is an extreme example.
Not only is this so because of the implicit threat to the Board's
administrative processes, but also because in that case the employer
had already permitted union activity and could not now argue that
it was something new and more disadvantageous to plant efficiency.
Nevertheless, Memphis Publishing is a step away from the Star-Brite
notion that the union activities' uniqueness lies not only in the
possible disorder but also in the fact that this is something which
it is natural for the employer to be against. The national labor policy
is not well served when antagonisms, which are undoubtedly real,
are so pampered.
In this writer's opinion, the best solution here would be the
overruling of Star-Brite. In its place the Board might substitute the
following language:
We hold that when employer promulgation of an otherwise valid rule is
in clear response to its knowledge of union organizational activity and
where background evidence indicates an appreciably less rigid employer
attitude in general disciplinary matters, that the rule is retaliation prohibited by the Act and thus presumptively invalid. Respondent relies on
Star-Brite, where the Board said that "it . . . would be an anomaly to
recognize that an employer may lawfully adopt such a rule, yet to hold
that he may not do so when the occasion for its use arises." We believe
that this dictum fails to appreciate the valid criteria of production and
discipline through which an employer may justify an impingement on
Section 7 rights. An employer who is concerned with his legitimate interest
in efficiency will have announced or required his employees to understand
197. See SwADos, ON

=hE LINE

(1957).
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a proper rule prohibiting solicitation during working time prior to union
organizational efforts. If union solicitation leads to employee distraction
or inefficiency, an employer may promulgate a rule to safeguard the success
of his business operation. To the extent that Star-Brite is inconsistent
with this principle, that case is hereby overruled.

The Board should however make it clear that a prior rule need not
necessarily be in published form but rather that it must be generally
announced or understood prior to union activity. It would be inflexibly legalistic to hold that the rule must be written out and read
by everyone. My approach strikes a middle ground on this point.
It does the same in requiring loose discipline in order to create a presumption with respect to timing. If an employer had carefully regulated the working time of his employees prior to an organizational
campaign the Board would then be confronted with a different and
less compelling argument for a violation.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND TE QuAsI-PuBLIc PROBLEM
In dictum intended to defend a recent decision upholding employee
rights to solicit on company property the Board stated the following:
Their place of work is the one location where employees are brought together on a daily basis. It is the one place where they clearly share common
interests and where they traditionally seek to persuade fellow workers in
matters affecting their union organizational life and other matters related

to their status as employees.' 98

But another judicially recognized concept is that of employer
property rights. This concept is responsible, in part, for the characterization of solicitation rights as those which are based "traditionally"
outside the plant. 9 9 Thus the above quoted passage raises a considerable conflict of principles. In Marsh v. Alabama, 0° the Supreme
Court held that the constitutionally protected right to distribute
literature in the business or "regular shopping center" of a company
owned town was superior to property rights insofar as that case was
concerned. In Marsh the Court, citing Republic, said that the more
an owner "for his advantage opens up his property for use by the
public in general, the more do his rights become circumscribed by the
statutory and constitutional rights of those who use it."2'01 The Court
further categorized bridges, ferries, and turnpikes as operations which
have "essentially a public function" and subject to state regulation.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Gale Products, 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, 1249 (1963). (Emphasis added.)
E.g., Woolworth, supranote 58.
326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Id. at 506.
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Refusing to accord citizens in a company town an inferior constitutional status because of legal title, the Court held that municipal or
corporation interests notwithstanding, 2 2 property rights were not
sufficient to restrict these "fundamental liberties." Mr. Justice Frankfurter's more limited conclusions in a highly significant concurring
opinion were as follows:
Title of property as defined by State law controls property relations; it
cannot control issues of civil liberties which arise precisely because a
company town is a town as well as a congeries of property relations. And
similarly the technical distinctions on which a finding of "trespass" so often
depends are too tenuous to control decision regarding the scope of the vital
liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.203

Thus both the majority and, to some degree, concurring opinions
in Marsh provide for the preponderence of free-speech through
handbills as dominant over the property interest involved. Marsh
is then the touchstone of departure for the argument on behalf of
labor union activity as opposed to employer property interests. Babcock, as outlined above, severely qualified the right of non-employee
organizers to be on company parking lots. The attempts to reconcile
Marsh and Babcock are bound to produce tensions very shortly. If
nothing else, the phenomenal advent of shopping centers will assure
that confrontation.
2°4
While the property which the union sought to utilize in Bendix
may have been too personal in nature and unrelated to the enterprise
to make an employer refusal unlawful, the Supreme Court held in
NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co. 205 that a company could be required
to afford the union access to a hall in order to conduct an organizational meeting. While it is extremely doubtful that the Court, in
any circumstances, would have held the union entitled to use property
of a more personal unrelated nature, such as, for example, a home,2
Stowe's peculiarities should be noted. The Court was careful to set
forth the problem presented as that of a "company-dominated North
Carolina mill town" and thus unlike "the vast metropolitan centers
where a number of halls are available within easy reach of prospective union members." In the final analysis however, the Court's
opinion seems premised upon the disparate treatment accorded to the
union. The cease and desist order requiring union access was framed
conditionally, as are the union rebuttal cases, upon disparate treatment in ,the future.
202. Id. at 507.
203. Id. at 511. Compare the dissent of Mr. Justice Reed in which Chief Justice
Stone and Mr. Justice Burton concurrred. Cf. Tucker v. Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).
204. Supra, note 68.

205. 336 U.S. 226 (1949).
206. Cf. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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One cannot then analyze this case in terms of a company town
alone, Mr. Justice Jackson notwithstanding. 207 The Court, acknowledging the distinction between a hall and the previous outer limits
of a parking lot staked out by Le Tourneau, 2 8 understood and
20 9
measured the possibility that this was a more basic property right.
The relationship to the employer's business is less and thus inclines
toward a more personal right-one that is itself constitutionally protected. 210 But, in another sense, more analogous to Marsh, the property rights must diminish. This results from the access which the
public at large has to a hall. Viewed in this light, the Court's
approach is a brilliant one as it bottoms the arrived at result upon
the existence of unlawful discrimination. Since the hall is a difficult
piece of property to reach, in terms of the enterprise, the approach
must be a cautioned and restrained one.2 11 Marsh involves normal
governmental activity and thus the principle is not easily qualified.
While debatable, this would seem certainly not as strong in Stowe.
How better to formulate Stowe than as a right relative to public
access. According to my analysis of Marsh and Stowe, the company
town domination in those cases is secondary. Today's controversy
concerning union rights on shopping centers makes this approach
necessary for consideration. Curiously, the Board has never decided
a case in this area.
2 12 the Court, referring to Marsh and a
In Breard v. Alexandria,
companion case, said that "in neither case was there dedication
to public use but it seems fair to say that the permissive use of the
ways was considered equal to such dedications." 213 Most certainly
there is no dedication in Stowe. This concept of "permissive use"
would seem applicable to shopping centers if viewed as analogous
to a "public street or walk" which, although private property, is
more accessible to the general public.2 1 4 This is how the problem
was analyzed in Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Wonderland Shopping Center.21 5 In this case the Michigan Supreme
207. Stowe Spinning, supra note 89, at 235.

208. Id. at 229, 230.
209. Hanley, Union Organization on Company Property-A Discussion of Property
Rights, 47 GEo. L.J. 266, at 280 (1958).
210. See the dissent of Justice Reed. Stowe Spinning, supranote 89, at 236.
211. Cf. Phillips Petroleum, supra note 94, wherein the Board found a violation
without employer discrimination. See also the Board's opinion in Stowe Spinning Co.,
70 N.L.R.B. 614 (1946).
212. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
213. Id. at 643.
214. Comment, 10 SAN. L. REv. 694, 699, 700 (1958).
215. 122 N.W.2d 785 (1963); contra, Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees
Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 2092 (Wis. 1962); See in this regard, 49 VA. L. REv. 1571 (1963).
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Court,216 without utilizing the Breard rationale, held that the "dedi-

cated use" was that of a "modem public marketplace" in which the
public's right to free speech could not be denied. Here again as in
Stowe, there is an indication that a major, if not crucial, element
in the holding consists of the "arbitrary" and discriminatory power
217
to select who shall and shall not exercise their rights.
The Board in Marshall Field and Company218 held employees
"uniquely handicapped" by department store no-solicitation rules,
could have the benefit of non-employee union organizers on a company owned adjacent street which was available to the public. But
General Dynamics 219 made clear the limited scope to be given Marshall Field and Marsh through Board interpretation. In General
Dynamics, the company owned a "public thoroughfare" which was
used by the public. The incumbent union employees were permitted
to handbill on the street and similar rights were denied non-employee
organizers of the charging party. The Board held that disparity of
treatment220 for non-employees and employees was lawful under
Babcock and that under the same case's doctrines, the complaining
union had adequate alternate channels of communication. The adequacy argument notwithstanding, it would seem reasonable to assume
that the Board was correct in interpreting "other distribution" as
at least partially exclusive of employees rights under section 7. This
would open up the employer to attack every time he acquiesced in
statutory rights for employees.
The important aspect here, however, is that of the "public thoroughfare" and the relationship of Marsh and Babcock. Applicability of
the Marsh rationale, the Board admitted, was not "without persuasive
content." 21 But the Board held that Babcock was the controlling
case and had limited Marsh to its company town factual context.
Member Brown, dissenting 2z2 pointed out that Babcock concerned
company property from which the public was excluded and asserted
that "the Board Members unduly extend the reach of the Babcock
216. Reference here is to the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Smith.
217. Wonderland, supra note 215, at 797. The Court noted that the property
owner's power to exclude was "undesirable not by law but by the arbitrary decision
of the property owner."
218. 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952), aff'd an this point, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952);
cf. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 132 (1947); Brown Shipbuilding Co.,
66 N.L.R.B. 1047 (1946); United Aircraft Corp., 67 N.L.R.B. 594 (1946).
219. 137 N.L.R.B. 1725 (1962).
220. The employer was able to argue that there was no disparity between treatment
accorded non-employee organizers and the rest of the public. Management prohibited
all "commerciar' solicitation by outsiders on the thoroughfare.
221. Supra, note 219, at 1729.
222. Id. at 1730. Member Fanning did not participate in this case.
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and Wilcox decision in applying it to the present facts."223 The dissent
also argued that Marsh did not turn on the availability of communications theory 224 promulgated in Babcock. This is undoubtedly correct
and becomes clear if one only traces Justice Reed's dissent in Marsh
and other cases where he continually propounded the theory which
the Court eventually accepted in Babcock.2 s Marsh could not in
any event be structured on availability as petitioner there could have
easily distributed literature on public property. I believe that Member Brown's dissent, in terms of legal analysis, is the better view.
Public access to private property is an important factor in determining the scope of the constitutional and statutory right to inform.
The right becomes more valuable when one recognizes the general
unavailability of picketing to the organizing union because of section
8(b) (7) .226 The majority's interpretation of Babcock in General
Dynamics would make the organizational plight a more desperate one.
Babcock did not undertake to overrule Marsh. As the General
Dynamics majority notes, Babcock does not mention that case. Indeed
a good argument can be advanced for the consistency of Babcock
with Stowe, if not Marsh itself. This thesis proceeds upon the idea
that Babcock must be read conjunctively, as mentioned earlier, and
thus, although there is no union right to access (as in Stowe), disparate treatment will be unlawful. Implicit in Member Brown's
General Dynamics dissent is the relatively (more so than in Babcock)
unrelated-to-the-enterprise nature of the thoroughfare. This may be a
less compelling argument when advanced for employees pursuant
to Republic but it is more persuasive for the rights of non-employees
as derived from Stowe. Here the non-employee cannot be excluded
in the name of discipline as the enterprise's distance eliminates
this defense. Discriminatory intent may loom more important. The
Stowe theory becomes clearer when one observes, as do Member
Brown and the Trial Examiner, in General Dynamics the disparate
treatment accorded to employees and the public as distinguished from
non-employee organizers. The General Dynamic majority's response
to this argument insofar as the public is concerned must be to invoke
Marsh as a company town case. There is no other way out. But,
insofar as the argument touches upon employees, there can be no
distinction between them and non-employees as the thoroughfare
is more separate and thus distinguishable from the Babcock parking
lot. To the extent that discrimination could exist, it would be preferable to give non-employees the same rights as the general public and
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 1731.
Id. 1731, n.10.
Supra, note 14, at 513.
Id. at 509; see also, Comment, 10

STAN.

L. REv. 694, 700 n.34 (1958).
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preclude employee rights on the alternate communications theory
with a reverse twist-to the effect that these rights can be exercised
inside the plant pursuant to Republic. The limited scope given to
Marsh in General Dynamics would appear to be Board-imposed.
Of course the Board has deliberately involved itself (though it
may now be forced to do so by Steelworkers) in the special categorizations of employees so as to encourage analysis which speaks
of a company town and the department store, and Babcock would
seem to have preserved this. On the other hand, May deprecates
the "customary" channels to which the non-employee organizer is
relegated in General Dynamics as "catch-as-catch-can." Although
that principle can be restricted to captive audiences, or their equivalent, we have already noted the Board's reluctance to do so.
The missing link which does not permit Member Brown's dissent
to be as persuasive as it should be is the analogy to be drawn between
Marsh and Republic where no discrimination is needed and Stowe
and Babock where, in part, it is necessary. Marsh cannot completely
answer the question posed in General Dynamics. Stowe does. That
case articulates the right to access if the property is open to others
in an area where Republic type defenses against employees are not
available and where no legitimate distinction exists. Member Brown's
argument becomes stronger when the separate identity of the
thoroughfare vis-a'-vis the plant is recognized. But the above mentioned Stowe dictum and the majority's determination to see Marsh
as a special case, may have deterred the use of an opinion more
vulnerable linguistically. But if valor was needed, the dissent could
well have buttressed this argument with discretion. Babcock interprets Stowe, as does this analysis, on the basis of discrimination and
not the company town.227
Within the confines of this analysis, however, union rights in
shopping centers might be perilous. For clearly the shopping center
is more closely related to the enterprise in question than the thoroughfare in General Dynamics and the hall in Stowe.22 One can appreciate the brevity and general approach of Member Brown's dissent
if it is motivated by a concern to avoid this dilemma. Yet here it is
possible to overcome this problem and the Babcock alternate communications criteria by directing attention to the existence of a strong
economic invitation of the owner. Once again this is not the parking
lot from which the public is excluded, but rather an area which seeks
out non-employees. It can be argued that this invitation makes the
227. Babcock, supra note 83, at 111 n.4.
228. In one sense Stowe's hall could be viewed as more directly related to the
business. This would be arguable if the hall was considered to be business in itself.
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shopping center case a comparably stronger one for the union. And
this enterprise takes on a factor present in Marsh. The publicand the employee to a greater degree-must spend a considerable
amount of time there. The nature of the enterprise-stores for all
the consumers needs-compels this.
It would be dangerous to justify "quasi-public" use or "permissive
229
use" in terms of dedication as was done by the Michigan Court.
That requires the rather artificial conclusion that the owner is inviting
an individual onto private property so that the customer can exercise
free speech rights. The law will appear foolish if it implies such
a dedication for it is clear to anyone that the owner's motivations
are purely those of business. To the extent that handbilling is
tolerated or welcomed, one must view such a concession in the same
light. Surely goodwill for the business is the basic consideration.
It should then be clear that under this approach union organizers
will be excluded even where other groups are allowed to handbill
the shopping center. It will be a rare property owner that envisages
a union advertisement of a dispute with one of his lessees-upon
whose profits he depends-as in his business interest. If the law
is to interpret this union activity as within dedication's penumbra,
we should understand that legal interpretation has been stretched
to its outer limits. This is why the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Carr is able to score a very sound point on the majority in emphasizing the property's business purpose.230 Thus it would seem that
there is much to be said for avoidance of this issue in General
Dynamics. The concept of permissive use, as enunciated in Breard,
is preferable from the standpoint of realism.
Of course, the argument on behalf of union rights in shopping
centers is not without distracting qualities. While the Board may
properly hold that Babcock is not applicable on quasi-public grounds,
the same argument points up the very large extension that such a
holding would graft onto Republic or, for that matter, any case thus
far decided. Although it is a possible by-product in those cases,
even General Dynamics and Stowe do not reach the question of
informing the public at large about a labor dispute. We have
already noted the somewhat hostile reaction of both Congress and
the Court in regard to picketing and its impact on the public. If a
labor union could convince the Board that its activity is directed at
employees and not customers, it would be easier to decide in favor
of union rights. Of course, such a limited holding would undoubtedly
229. Wonderland, supra note 215, at 795.
230. Id. at 785. Strictly speaking there is no majority or dissenting opinion because
the case resulted in a tie vote by the Michigan Supreme Court. But such reference
is made to the opinions because the votes effect is to affirm the trial judge's opinion.
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be challenged in the courts under the Babcock theory. But public
handbilling would present squarely the Marsh issue and, as already
stated, could well take the Board beyond Marsh because of the
activity's potential (and hoped for) impact vis-A-vis the owner. In
this sense, the religious literature in Marsh cannot be related normally to the public or private owner.
The course that shopping center owners might follow (and will
increasingly follow, I believe, if union pressure becomes stronger)
is that of prohibiting handbilling of any kind in order to avoid the
charge of discrimination. Thus "other distribution" would no longer
be available to the Board under Babcock and a court might be less
willing to accuse the owner, as is done in Wonderland, of arbitrary
action insofar as union activity is concerned. Here one must seek
the guidelines from Marsh. For in that case discrimination is not
an element or, at the very least, an important one. If we can
analogize the contemporary shopping center to Marsh's business
district, the question will begin to answer itself. Clearly the owner's
exclusion of religious literature could not stand. Consequently, the
last hurdle, under the assumption of a proper analogy, is an equation
of union literature and religious literature. Thomas teaches us that
the equation must be made and that qualifications can be made only
when the activity merges into commercial solicitation. It is unlikely
that this problem would be raised in a shopping center case involving
the public. Normally the union, when it is concerned with the public,
wishes to inform and does not intend to engage in conduct which
consists of financial solicitations. Thus the chance that both legal
disadvantages-the public and commercial solicitation-would be
raised in one case is improbable.
But the argument could be made that the owner's business losses
are analogous to the potential harm to the community inherent in
commercial activity as apparently contemplated in Thomas. This
then would make the crucial question turn on whether the shopping
center owner's losses can be viewed as potential injury to the community and thus make union handbilling susceptible to regulation.
This proposition's merit, if any, derives from the concept which is
urged to support union rights. If the shopping center is a necessary
element of existence and thus quasi-public, the owner will say, is
not the business harm done to it a harm for the community. Aside
from the horror with which most American employers would view
an argument which-even if it suited immediate purposes-implies a
public nature for private property, the proposition must fail on
account of the Supreme Court's sensitivity to first amendment and
section 7 rights.
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The Board should distinguish General Dynamics from shopping
centers and hold that in the latter case permissive use and the
center's importance to the community compel the application of
section 7 rights for non-employee distribution. This would, of course,
lead to a re-examination and retreat from the Marsh analysis. But
the potential benefits would far outweigh the possible embarrassment resulting from a confession of error. Moreover, the Board
should emphasize the legitimate need to fill the void in peaceful
organizing tactics left especially by section 8(b) (7). And because
of the spread out areas which shopping centers serve, the lack of
public sidewalks and adjacent high speed highways, it is possible
(though not probable) that a presumptive imbalance in organizational opportunities could be found under Babcock. However, this
approach utilized in May has been taken under the apparently distinguishable criteria set forth in Steelworkers. But there is no sign
which contradicts a continuing increase in shopping centers as a way
of economic life in the burgeoning suburbs. This factor, despite the
argument that rights of non-employees vis-A-vis non-employers
(center owners) is a tenuous one,231 weighs heavily in favor of section
7 rights.232 Indeed, as the California Supreme Court has recently
stated in a case presenting the more questionable free speech form
of picketing in a shopping center "the interest of the union ... rests
upon the solid substance of public policy and constitutional right: the
interest of the plaintiff [owner] lies in the shadow cast by a property
2a
right worn thin by public usage."23
Similarly, one cannot but attach the importance of the Breard
concept to other enterprises which, by their nature, are dependent
upon public access. This is part of the teaching to be derived from
33
Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Garner v. Louisiana
This opinion raises the most slippery aspect of these cases: what is
state action? The Board need not concern itself with this question in
deciding the breadth of section 7 rights. But the courts must look
to the meaning of state action in order to apply the first amendment.
Marsh must hinge on the concept of state action and the state
court's enforcement of the trespass statute.234 This principle, subse231. See Note, 73 HAnv. L. REv. 1216, 1217-18 (1960).

232. Chairman McCulloch's dissent in Salyer Stay Ready, supra, might support the
viewpoint that section 7 rights increase in proportion to the less direct relationship.
232a. Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery and Confectionary Workers, 57
L.R.R.M. 2036, 2040 (Cal. 1964); the court's inclination to view picketing as free

speech under the Thornhill doctrine has been recently substantiated in NLRB v. Local
760, Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See
especially the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Black.
233. 368 U.S. 157 (1961); see Justice Douglas' concurring opinion id. at 177.
234. See Note, 73 HAv. L. REv. 1216, 1217-18 (1960).
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quently articulated in Shelley v. Kraemer,35 bids us make the judgment of public and private rights in terms utilized above. It does
not necessarily turn on the governmental nature of the business in
question. And this is the excess-in the opinion of this writer-in
which Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion indulges.
While Justice Douglas stated the Marsh proposition that "the
police are supposed to be on the side of the Constitution . . .,11
the concurring opinion seems to have gone a step further in characterizing restaurants as "public facilities." Since Justice Douglas
further remarked that a restaurant could be private property for
many purposes and public for others, it might be fair to restrict
the conclusion to cases like Garner which concern racial discrimination.23 7 One is obliged to note the opinion's analogy of restaurants
to those industries "affected with a public interest" and the theory
that "a license to establish a restaurant is a license to establish a
public facility and necessarily imparts, in law, equality of use for
all members of the public."2 8 The former proposition might expand
"state action" beyond the enterprise which is viewed as governmental
in nature. The same can be said for the latter although this example
of state action is comparatively less blurred. Any theory which relies
on what is and what is not governmental is sure to flounder. In
Sweden the shopping center might always be a private cooperative.
In Britain steel may soon be owned by the government. To decide
cases on this basis would tempt a resurrection of the judicial incorporation of economic philosophy that Mr. Justice Holmes so eloquently persuaded us to abandon239 Nor can the importance in its
effect on the public interest be utilized as Justice Douglas suggests.
Beyond the same questions of economic judgment by the courts, one
must look back to Republic and thus recognize that while the steel
industry, for instance, affects the public interest, this cannot logically
argue for the rights of anyone to wander round company property in
search of constitutional rights. The public interest example is simply
not relevant.
Yet the idea of public access is a good one. Of course, to the
extent that the products sold are more elemental and, as in the
case of shopping centers, cover a wide variety of necessities, the
argument for a constitutional right becomes stronger. State enforcement of trespass statutes or civil suits in regard to these cases would
be state action which offends the fourteenth amendment. This
235. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
236. Garner, supra note 233, at 177.

237. Id. at 177, 181.
238. Id. at 181, 182, 184; Contra, Note, 77 HIv.L. REv. 361, 364 (1963).

239. E.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277, 280 (1918).
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should apply to parking lots of retail department stores 240 and- supermarkets which are open to the public as well as to employees. This
principle could be applied in a limited fashion to the store itselfeven in the department store where the employer has a legitimate
concern in preserving, without disruption, the customer-employee
relationship. The question is only when and how. 241 It might be
possible to have brief non-employee handbilling (here a StoddardQuirk distinction could be important) during slack hours. If Justice
Douglas' opinion becomes a prevailing one, such activity might have
good constitutional backing. The Board could devise or have the
parties devise regulations. However, it should be noted that this
notion of rights runs afoul of what the Board now considers the
organizer's rights to be in department stores.242 Perhaps the disruption of the customer-employee relationship is too important to
justify the logical consequences of the Garner concurrence. But
these considerations do not seem to apply to shopping centers and
retail store parking lots. 243 Perhaps new rulings upholding union
organizing rights in these areas would justifiably permit the Board
and the courts to preclude activity proximate to the customeremployee relationship.
Wonderland points up the fact that state action, in the sense in
which it has been discussed herein, will not always be the question.
This is because the union, in Wonderland, never went on the shopping center property to run the gauntlet of state criminal prosecution,
but rather sought a declaratory judgment of their constitutional
rights. Suppose the state had decided in favor of the property owner
defendant. Is this state inaction so as to violate the fourteenth
amendment? 244 Suppose, to carry this a step further, that the court's
decision was more dependent upon petitioner's need for a declaratory
judgment than the merits of the free speech issue. It would appear
that the important element here is enforcement in the courts and
not, primarily, police action as such. This is the holding of Shelley
and Marsh. If the courts do not allow petitioner to exercise his
rights, the constitutional infringement would appear equally detrimental in both declaratory judgments and trespass violations. But
240. Cf. People v. Goduto, 21 IMI.2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 927 (1961).
241. Cf. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
242. See May, supra note 137, at 801 n.16. But see Marshall Field, supra note 218;
Associated Dry Goods Corp. (Lord & Taylor Div.), 103 N.L.R.B. 271 (1953), aff'd,
209 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1954); Goldblatt Bros., 77 N.L.R.B. 1262 (1948).
243. In fact they do not even apply to the employee-only the parking lot in
Babcock.
244. See Note, 49 VA. L. REv. 1571, 1578 (1963).
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the theme of state inaction is an important one and we shall return
to it presently.

One final word should be said about property rights. Much has
been written about the separation of ownership and control in
modem industry and its effects on corporation policy.245 We no
longer premise our political thinking about the company upon the
assumption that we are confronted with the old style entrepreneur.
If we devise policy on these assumptions in other areas, so also
should we treat property rights in labor cases with less deference for
traditional and customary rights. That which is traditional and
customary is no longer here. Is the shopping center traditional? The
Michigan Supreme Court is right to say that it is not. In fact the
shopping center, though clearly distinguishable from the normal
example, is nevertheless a classic example of separation as between
ownership and control. It would be fair to say that many of the
unorganized firms may be smaller and may thus contain the older
organization and conservative attitudes. But I believe that the courts
must extract themselves from what is, as Professor Galbraith would
put it, a vested interest in an idea.246 It is time to re-examine the
notion implicit in Babcock-that property ownership is a near absolute defense to constitutional or statutory rights, insofar as unions
are concerned. Thus it is submitted that the rhetoric concerning
employer property rights indulged in in Stoddard-Quirk,for instance,
is unfortunate and unnecessary. 247 The law must adapt itself to a
recognition of plant-site activity's importance and, at the same time,
the substantial interests that an employer has in the well being of
his enterprise. 248
IV. A NOTE

ON PRE-EMPTION

The problems arising from pre-emption-the exclusion of state
jurisdiction when the federal government extensively regulates or
dominates a particular subject matter-make it probable that state
inaction, far from being unconstitutional, may normally be a con245. See, for instance, BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954);
CROSLAND, THE FTn-raE OF SOCIALISm (1956); MEANS, THE ConionATE REvoLUnoN
IN AMEuCA (1962).
246. GALBnArH TAE AFFLUENT SocIETY (1958).

247. Stoddard-Quirk, supra note 17, at 620.
248. It is possible to argue that the unions, now in possession of large treasuries,
should be required to pay compensation for non-employee access, like the rental fee
in Stowe. This has a certain merit to it in that unions themselves are financially
healthy and would be quite able to pay. But how can one assess compensation? Handbilling in the parking lot will require janitorial services which the union could pay
for. But the employer may not see the union obligation in so limited a sense. Cf.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
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stitutional prerequisite for state courts confronted with the contending rights of organizers and property owners or employers. In the
landmark Garmon case 249 the Supreme Court held that "When an
activity is arguably subject to §7 and §8 of the act, the States as well
as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the
National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference
with national policy is to be averted."210 The "arguably" concept is
a far reaching one. But Garnon also preserves traditional state
sovereignty in cases where violence and threats to the public order
are present. This will cause difficulty in cases where the employer or
owner seeks the assistance of the state police and courts in ejecting
non-employee organizers from company property. Doubts are now
aggravated because the Supreme Court has deliberately withheld
comment on the obvious tensions involved in reconciling pre-emption
with the application of state trespass statutes. 25' This issue has been
52
more recently presented in People v. Goduto.
In that case the Illinois Supreme Court was confronted with an
alleged trespass on a department store parking lot which was open
to customers and employees. Union organizers entered the lot to
distribute union leaflets and questionnaires to store employees. The
employer informed the organizers that no such activity could be
conducted without company permission. The organizers, however,
refused to leave, declaring that they had a legal right to be on the
lot. The court held that their subsequent arrest and conviction was
proper under Gamon as "when a person refuses to leave another's
property after he has been ordered to do so, a threat of violence
becomes imminent."2 5 3 The court reasoned that if the state had not
intervened, the company would have been reduced to self-help and
thus potential violence. But the court was visibly troubled by
Garmon's explicit acceptance of primary jurisdiction for the Boardm4
and the careful scrutiny for evidence of violence to which state
249. 359 U.S. 236 (1959); Cf. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945); See also
Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297 (1954);
Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline and Threshold of "Litigating Elucidation," 39
U. Dm. L.J. 539 (1962); Gregory, Federal or State Control of Concerted Union
Activities, 46 VA. L. REv. 539 (1960); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and
State JurisdictionOver Labor Relations, 59 CoLum. L. REv. 6 (1959).
250. Garmon, supra note 249, at 245-46.
251. Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20 (1957).
252. 21 IM. 2d 605, 174 N.E.2d 385 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 927 (1961);
See Note, 60 MxcH. L. REv. 1010 (1962). Cf. Retail Clerks Local No. 1564 v. Your
Food Stores of Sante Fe, Inc., 225 F.2d 659 (10th Cir. 1955).
253. Id. at 387.
254. Contra, International Union, Local 232, U.A.W., A.F.of L., v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245 (1949). Cf. NLRB v. Insurance Agents
International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 493 n.23 (1960).
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court records are subjected. Mere potential violence, the court
seemed to say, requires an examination of Garmon's impact on Babcock. The latter case, however, laid the foundations upon which the
court built its case. Conceding the possibility of pre-emption under
Garmon (and thus the "arguably" test) the court held that state
courts could not be divested of jurisdiction where, as here, the organizers did not utilize Board processes. It is possible that the result
achieved is correct, although the court's reasoning is quite unsound.
Implicit in Goduto is the assumption that the employer-evidently
guided by his understanding of the law-will always seek to remove
organizers from his property. The court is aided in this assumption
by its own conclusion that constitutional rights are not at stake25 5 and
thus state action is no obstacle. Babcock, it must be admitted, does
sound a rather poignant ring for the employer's plight. Suffice it to say
that that case, viewed from almost any analysis, would seem to require
litigation. And to the extent that it affords clarity, the merits are
presumptively resolved in favor of the employer. The latter viewpoint
frees him from Garmon, but it is not one which the court accepts.
Thus the employer invokes a state criminal action in the face of
ambiguities and negates exclusive federal jurisdiction. A failure by
the organizers to file an unfair labor practice charge is not the
answer.
Suppose that an employee solicits during a lunch hour and thus
remains clearly and not arguably with the ambit of protected activity.
Are we not faced with analogous circumstances if the employer
discharges him and he refuses to leave the premises? Management
will interpret such action as a challenge to its authority. Is not
violence imminent so as to justify similar state action? Suppose, to
take a more marginal case, an employee is discharged just before
clocking in or out?2 6 Is the state always entitled to resolve the
merits of the unclear 8(a)(3) charge in favor of the employer?
If the employee has acted within his rights-as he clearly has in our
first example-does the state act correctly in employing its power
against him? Assuming that the answer is no, does Garmon permit
the state to withhold an equal standard of protection for the workers
whose rights are only "arguably" protected? It is highly probable
that such employee cases can present the courts with rights questions
even more uncertain than those of non-employees. And the argument
that non-employees should choose Board processes is equally ap255. Goduto, supra note 252, at 390: "this freedom of solicitation is the result of a
regulatory statute and not a constitutional right." (citing Republic). Contra, Marsh v.
Alabama, supra piote 200.
• 256. Cf. Remington Rand, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 152 (1953); Midland Mfg. Co., 134
N.L.R.B. 10 (1961)...
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plicable to employees. It is, of course, more hazardous if the organizer
is precluded, as is the case now, from obtaining a declaratory judgment or advisory opinion from the Board which determines his rights,
This compels the organizer to risk criminal prosecution, as in Goduto,
in order to travel the road which Goduto says should have been utilized beforehand. To make matters worse, the union, if it files a
charge subsequent to court action, is entirely dependent upon the
Board to enjoin the state court proceeding in federal district court257
Finally, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Marshall Field 8 upholding
the statutory right of non-employee organizers to solicit on a companyowned street open to customers and employees under the Marsh
principle, would seem to push non-employee rights in Goduto beyond
the "arguably" level. The Board's holding, premised upon the
organizational difficulties of department store employees, would seem
in point in determining Goduto. But, as mentioned above, there is
now some doubt about that holding's viability.259
The Illinois Court's conclusion, however, is probably all that the
state judiciary can do within the framework of existing law. The
crucial distinction between employees and non-employees must turn
on the control that the employer is able to exercise in each case.
Presumably, more power can be exerted upon employee conductespecially if the power takes the form of an order rather than that of
outright discharge. In either case the employee may file a charge. In
the former instance it is readily apparent that violence is hardly a
problem. One can also assume that the former example is the more
prevalent. This is in contrast to that of the non-employees in Goduto.
In Goduto the employer is relatively helpless without state interference or his own affirmative action. The employer cannot trigger an
8(a) (3) proceeding through discharge, as would be the case with
employees and, more important, management requests will be without force of authority. Yet one must ultimately premise agreement
(or perhaps sympathy) with the Illinois court on the vagueness of
federal law. The employer's concern with non-customers moving
around on his property and with the consequent risk of liability to
257. Capital Service, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 501 (1954). Cf. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. lichman Bros., 348 U.S.- 51-1 (1955). Under Capital Service the
Board may enjoin action pursuant to section 10(1) of the act on the grounds that
such action is "necessarily in aid of jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1958). A more
thorough analysis is contained in Comment, 74 HAav. L. REV. 726 (1961); Comment, 27
U. Cm. L. REv. 738 (1960). Concerning the problems posed above, the adjudicatory
process, as outlined, makes the union's position even more disadvantaged than that
normally imposed in a picket line injunction. To make the picket line case analogous,
one would have to assume that not only was the union not guilty of violence but that
also employer instigated violence precipitated the injunction.
258. 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952).
259. May, supra note 242.
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other invitees is a legitimate one. This factor, when coupled with
the grave shadows of doubt cast over this area by Babcock, makes
plausible the court's conclusions.
One would hope that the Board will create an advisory opinion
process similar to that utilized for other types of jurisdictional ques260
tions, which would be available to unions, employees and employers.
It is obvious that more clarity than Babcock affords is needed. Perhaps the Supreme Court will reconsider that case at an appropriate
time. But, acting within the confines of Babcock, the Board should
clarify the principles applicable to non-employees on public access
property, such as in Goduto, without unnecessary qualifications. One
necessary qualification might well be that organizers register with the
owners before entering onto company property. It is to be hoped
that the Board resolves the existing doubts in favor of access for
organizers. Certainly this would be the preferable answer in Goduto
where employees-as distinguished from the public-were solicited.
A post-Goduto development highlights a possible avenue through
which the employer might alleviate his vulnerability under Board
auspicies rather than those of the states. It is accepted that nonemployee conduct on company property that is tinged with violence
is unlawful under section 8(b) (1) (A) of the act. 2 1' The Supreme

Court has held that that provision does not extend to peaceful
activity such as picketing, as the Board once contended, but rather
is restricted to "rough stuff" or violence. 2 But the Court seems to
2
have retreated somewhat from that approach in ILGWU v. NLRB 6
where the non-violent execution of a contract between an employer
and a minority union was held to violate that provision. General
Motors Corp.24 makes it clear that ILGWU may now be an impetus
to application of 8(b)(1) (A) to the Goduto-type case. If so, the
employer, theoretically is not helpless. In General Motors, the Board
held that the union as well as the employer violated the act by
maintaining in effect a contract restricting the solicitation rights of
employees other than activity conducted on behalf of the signatory
union. This new vista propounded by the Board without discussion
would seem to graft onto 8(b) (1) (A) something like the "interfer260. This suggestion is contained in Note, 70 YALE L.J. 441 (1961). This proposal,
however, does not appear to contemplate access for unions and employees as well
as employers.
261. 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (a) (Supp. I, 1959): "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce . . .
employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7 ... ." Cf. J. A. Banta,
116 N.L.R.B. 1787 (1956).
262. NLRB v. Drivers Local Union, 362 U.S. 274 (1960).
263. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
264. 147 N.L.R.B. No. 59, 56 L.R.R.M. 1241 (1964).
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ence" concept previously relating to 8 (a) (1) alone.ma But the hold-

ing, if adhered to, makes it arguable that the employer (or the

employee) in Goduto could obtain relief from the Board.
It should be noted that some state courts seem unaware of the preemption's impact on labor cases. The Michigan Supreme Court, for
instance, adopted the trial judge's notion that such difficulties were
overcome through lack of a "labor dispute." Babcock notwithstanding,
the union's dispute with this secondary employer would lead to
secondary boycott and publicity proviso problems covered in section
8(b) (4),265 But the court did not address itself to the problem. The
California Supreme Court has held that the preemption question need
not be reached where the union activity in question is free speech.26a
This is erroneous as the jurisdictional question should be the first
problem with which a court must deal. The Washington Supreme
Court held, without discussion of Babcock, that handbilling and
picketing are "arguably" subject to other section 8(b) provisions.2 66
The concurring opinion, however, premised jurisdiction, as did
Michigan, on the non-existence of a 'labor dispute."267 One would
hope that, if nothing else, Chief Justice Warren's characterization
of the solicitation problem as a 'labor dispute"268 would clarify this
point for the state judiciary. Garmon focuses attention on sections 7
and 8. Indeed, read literally, that case can be interpreted as encompassing more.269 But under either test, the Michigan Supreme Court
should not be able to retain jurisdiction in Wonderland.
V. CO

T TmG UNIoNs An =ra COLLEcrC E BARGANNG AGRMEtmr
It is fundamental that employees may solicit or distribute literature
on plant premises for any number of unions and that a company
264a. But see Brief for the National Labor Relations Board in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, General Motors Corp. v. NLRB, p. 13, n.12
(October, 1964): "As noted above the union is not contesting enforcement of the
Board's order against it. In any event the Union's participation in the unlawful restraint
of employee rights, through execution of the collective bargaining agreement was
violative of Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, as the company's participation was
violative of Section 8(a)(1) Cf. International Ladies Garment Workers Union v.
NLRB 366 U.S. 731, 738...."
265. 61 Stat. 141,29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1958).
265a. Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery and Confectionary Workers,
57 L.R.R.M. 2036, 2040 (Cal. 1964). It is quite likely that the picketing here was
organizational and thus a question for the Board under section 8(b) (7). Alternatively
it would be preempted because of Babcock and the Board's obligation to determine the
rights of non-employee organizers on private property."
266. Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961.). Cf.
Moreland Corp. v. Retail Store Employees Union, 50 L.R.R.M. 2092 (Wis. 1962).
267. Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union, 58 Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803, 806 (1961).
268. Steelworkers, supra note 84, at 368.
269. Garmon, supra note 249, at 245.
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which restricts the rights of employees favoring one union while

allowing another union to conduct its activities on company premises
will violate, not only 8(a)(1) but also possibly 8(a)(2) which pro-

hibits company dominated unions.2 0 The Board has recently held
that section 7 rights are not only those of all competing unions but also

belong to the candidates campaigning for union office within an

incumbent bargaining representative. 271 But, as should be expected,
these campaigns which often pit worker against worker, more so

than against employers, are often those in which employer defenses
may be invoked successfully on behalf of rules that are presumptively
invalid. This area, especially if it encompasses those cases where

protected anti-union activity is conducted at the same time, would
seem to present a situation in which the employer may quite often
say, with justification, that disputes among workers imperil produc-

tion272 and that allegedly defamatory or inflammatory statements
place solicitation beyond its proper bounds.273 Therefore it is not
surprising that the cases, where possible, have carefully hedged
against an unnecessary bestowal of equal privileges for both sides.
More specifically, this has become an area where the Board has
attempted to preserve the desired stability which is important to the
collective bargaining relationship by prohibiting non-employee access

to the enterprise for the purpose of ousting the incumbent. But,
insofar as employees alone are concerned, this is a policy which is now

thundering off the tracks.
It has been held that union business representatives may-without
270. See IAM v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72 (1940); Cf. Harrison Sheet Steel Co. v. NLRB,
194 F.2d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 1952); Sinko Mfg. & Tool Co. 149 N.L.R.B. No. 21, 57
L.R.R.M. 1281 (1964).
271. General Aniline & Film Corp., 145 N.L.R.B. No. 119, 55 L.R.R.M. 1126 (1964).
272. Cf. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1956); Stuart F.
Cooper Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 142 (1962); United Aircraft Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 1632
(1961).
273. See NLRB v. United Aircraft, supra at 126, n.1; Patterson-Sargent Co., 115
N.L.R.B. 1627 (1956); of. Walls Mfg. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1962), aff'd, 321
F.2d 753 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 923 (1963); Blue Bell, Inc., 107
N.L.R.B. 514 (1953), rev'd, 219 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1955); Hood v. Stafford, 56
L.R.R.M. 2340 (Tenn. 1964). The Supreme Court has held the Tennessee courts
to be without jurisdiction in a shopping center in Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S. 301 (1964).
49 Stat. 452, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (Supp. I, 1959): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer... to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of
any labor organization or contribute financial or other support to it....
Maryland
Drydock Co. v. NLRB, 183 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1950); Thor Power Tool Co., 148
N.L.R.B. No. 131, 57 L.R.R.M. 1161 (1964); Frohman Mfg. Co., 107 N.L,R.B. 1308
(1954); El Mundo Broadcasting Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1954). Misrepresentations
before an election present a somewhat analogous problem. Of. NLRB v. Trancoa, 303
F.2d 456 (1st-Cir. 1962); United Aircraft Corp., 103 N.L.R.B. 102 (1953).
The only other tenable defense available to an employer is that of a safety hazard.
Remington Rand, Inc., 103 N.L.R.B. 152 (1953).
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contractual authority and where workers are not easily accessible off
company property-gain access for the purpose of assisting grievance
processing.2 7 4 The same agent must be admitted to aid in negotiating
a new contract. 75 At the same time, the Board has made it clear
that such access, even where pursuant to contractual authority, must
be utilized for grievances and not solicitation or campaigning against
an outside union. 276 But an apparently less ticklish question is presented where no relationship is yet established and non-employee
organizers seek privileges equal to their counterparts who campaign
on behalf of another union. The above-mentioned considerations
do not exist in that, presumably, a relationship such as the act
contemplates is lacking. And although one must speak in a qualified
manner here, to the extent that an agreement between one campaigning union and employer is asserted, it is important to inquire
carefully into the union's position as a bona fide representative of
the employees. Equal access for rival organizers acts as a barrier
to the company-union agreement of which Justice Frankfurter warned
27 7
in Steelworkers.
Thus the Second Circuit has held that, upon proper request, it is unlawful for management to bar access for one union's organizers while
another union enjoys such privileges.2 78 It is unfair for an employer to
prohibit one union's rebuttal of a captive audience speech while
another union can reply.2 79 Ironically, the Board's real problem here
has developed out of judicial reliance upon the Steelworkers case
which expressed great concern for the 8(a) (2) abuses that might
flow out of employer acquiescence in union solicitation privileges.
In GEM International,Inc.2 80 the Board held that an organizer who
was prevented from distributing material on the walk in front of
the store, refused names and addresses of employees and ejected
274. NLRB v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 122 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1941), affirming 25
N.L.R.B. 36 (1940); Richfield Oil Corp., 49 N.L.R.B. 593 (1943), aff'd, 143 F.2d
860 (9th Cir. 1944); General Petroleum Corp., 49 N.L.R.B. 606 (1943).
275. Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. No. 179, 56 L.R.R.M. 1108 (1964).
276. Laub Baking Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 869 (1961). Laub intimates that, absent
contractual authority, the Board will not protect the union representatives' right of
access. But for the employee the right to process grievances on company property
would appear to be an implied one. Market Basket, 144 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 54
L.R.R.M. 1263 (1963); Cf. Crucible Steel Castings Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 494 (1952);
Cullman Elec. Co-op., 99 N.L.R.B. 753 (1952).
277. Steelworkers, supra note 84, at 363.
278. Majestic Molded Prods., Inc. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1964),
affirming 143 N.L.R.B. 71 (1963).
279. KFSD-TV, 111 N.L.R.B. 566 (1955).
280. 137 N.L.R.B. 1343 (1962). Cf. Fiore Bros. Oil Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 191 (1962);
Holyoke Cinema Shops, Inc., 139 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1962); Salmirs Oil Co., 139 N.L.R.B.
25 (1962); Bargain City USA, Inc., 129 N.L.R.B. 93 (1960); Dixie Bedding Mfg. Co.,
121 N.L.R.B. 189 (1958).
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from the retail store for failure to produce the store's "membership
card" (company forbade "membership" for those employed by a
labor union) was unlawfully denied access equal to that of other
organizers who solicited during work time, even though a formal
request for access was not made. The Board found that a request
was not necessary as the complainant's presence in the store was
"tantamount to notice." But, while finding an 8(a) (2) violation and
an unlawful unionshop contract, the Board, in dictum, stated that the
futility of a request was "conjectural."2 1 This helped provide the
basis for a most unfortunate reversal by the Eighth Circuit.m That
court said section 8(a) (1) "imposes no special duty upon employers
for the benefit of nonemployee organizers.... It is only where (and
insofar as) the employees themselves would be denied organizational
rights that the employer must permit outside organizers to come
onto the premises; the organizers' own interests are entirely secondary."2
Analogizing Steelworkers hostility to per se violations
vis-at-vis employer action, the Eighth Circuit concluded that "the
enforcement of an otherwise valid no-solicitation rule against one
union, but not against another, is not per se illegal. The employees'
right to organize is certainly no less basic or entitled to protection
than is their right to choose among different bargaining representatives."2 4 Thus, carrying Steelworkers one step further, the court held
that the union's failure to request access at an "appropriate lever'
was fatal despite the Board finding of notice. Notice, said the court,
was presented with "clearer evidence" in Steelworkers. Since that
case invoked anti-union solicitation and was not unlawful per se,
surely, it was reasoned, preference as to a particular type of solicitation is not unlawful. Thus the court held that GEM presented a
weaker argument for violation than the one rejected by the Supreme
Court.
There is an obvious logic to this reasoning. As mentioned earlier,
employer anti-union action will have the most impact on the worker's
mind and it is, to say the least, strange to approve of the employer's
rights but, in the same context, restrict the rights of others opposed
to the union. Presumably, the court, pursuant to Steelworkers' reasoning would have found no violation if nonemployees had conducted
an anti-union campaign. The act, however, should condemn both
fact situations as unlawful. Logic on this point is in the camp of
the Eighth Circuit. But Steelworkers is a "narrow" question applicable only to employer action and it should be treated as such.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. at 1346.
GEM Intl, Inc. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 626 (8th Or. 1963).
Id. at 631.
Ibid.
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In the final analysis, the Eighth Circuit reversed the Board on the
failure to make a request. Steelworkers notwithstanding, it is clear
that a non-employee must make a proper request for similar privileges.
The employer's attitude towards both unions bears out the futility
of request. One must conclude that the Board's choice of the word
"conjecture" in approaching this question served as a wedge for the
court's conclusion. But here our criticism must be primarily directed
at the Supreme Court. It is to be regretted that cases will stand
or fall on the concept of out-dated pleadings. GEM should make it
clear that the request criterion can prove quite harmful with respect
to some of the considerations that prompted its use in Steelworkersthe potential 8(a) (2) violation.
Suppose, however, that there is no competition in the initial
organizational campaign and that a lawful -collective bargaining
aggreement is negotiated between the parties. Suppose, further, that
the union signs a contract in which it agrees not to engage in solicitation or distribution on company property until the agreement's
expiration. Is such a bargaining away of section 7 rights an effective
promise which union members are obliged to keep? Most Board
decisions have assumed in dictum that the union may bargain away
the right to solicit and distribute.2 A couple of cases have relied on
this assumption as a conclusion of law.286 In the recent Gale Products
case 287 the Board appeared slightly hesitant about meeting the
question. But it would now seem that the earlier holdings and
2 88
dictum are viewed as correct.
The importance of Gale Products lies in that decision's impact on
the rights of minority unions where the majority union, as exclusive
representative, contracted away union activity on company property.
In Gale Products the Board said that minority union organizational
activity brought into focus "an altogether different problem" than
that concerning the majority union, as here the restrained conduct
contained an "expression of dissatisfaction with that labor organization." It was noted that "a salutary purpose may be achieved by
refusing to disturb concessions yielded by either party through the
processes of collective bargaining." But the Board held that no
285. Burroughs-Wellcome & Co., 68 N.L.R.B. 175, 176 (1946); May Department
Stores, 59 N.L.R.B. 976, 988 n.17 (1944); North American Aviation, Inc., 56 N.L.R.B.
959, 962 n.2 (1944).

286. Fruitvale Canning Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 884, 885 (1950); W. T. Smith Lumber
Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 606, 616 (1948); but see Clinton Foods, Inc., 112 N.L.R.B. 239,
263 (1955).
287. 142 N.L.R.B. 1246, reversed, 57 L.R.R.M. 2164 (7th Cir. 1964); accord, General
Motors Corp., 144 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 54 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1963) (See Note, 16 STA.
L.R uv.456 (1964).
288. General Motors Corp., supra note 264.
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"special circumstances" apparently affecting production and discipline 289 existed to rebut the presumption of invalidity. Absent such

circumstances, "neither an employer nor an incumbent union is
entitled . .. to freeze out another union by trenching on statutory

rights of employees to engage in protected activities. 290 Chairman

McCulloch and Member Leedom dissented on the grounds that the
contracting away of solicitation rights is less basic to employees than

the already permissible no-strike clause.29 '

Gale Products is then something of a departure from the goal of
contractual stability. It would be possible, and indeed I believe
preferable, to tolerate this derailment as a petty inconvenience were
it not for the fundamental basis upon which the case is decided. For
Gale Products turns upon the existence of minority union activity

which is not party to the contractual prohibition. Now this is brew
most heady. Indeed, what the Board seeks to do is to turn, at the
very least, the spirit of the Supreme Court 1.I. Case2' decision upon
its head. The seemingly converse question in J. I. Case was whether

an individual contract could not be effective as a waiver of any
benefit to which the employee otherwise would be entitled under the
collective bargaining agreement. Here, of course, the question is
whether the collective agreement can waive otherwise existent individual rights. But the Court's language, in I. 1.Case, points up
the Gale Products conflict:
[W]here there is great variation in circumstances of employment or capacity
of employees, it is possible for the collective bargain to prescribe only
minimum rates or maximum hours or expressly to leave certain areas
open to individual bargaining. But except as so provided, advantages
to individuals may prove as disruptive to industrial peace as disadvantages.
They are a fruitful way of interfering with organization and choice of

289. Gale Prods., supra note 287, at 1249. Thus 28TH ANNUAL REPOnT o im
NLRB 64 (1963), would appear to be in error: "the majority was of the view that
the validity of a contractual waiver of employee rights must depend upon whether
the interference with the employees statutory rights is so great as to overrule any
legitimate reasons for upholding the waiver and concluded that in this case a finding
of contractual waiver was unwarranted because the employer's only basis for the
prohibition was the elimination of interference with production."
290. Gale Prods., supra note 287, at 1249.
291. See Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); NLRB v.
Sands Mfg. Co., 306 U.S. 332 (1939). The dissent also argues that the contract
places employees in the same position that non-employees have pursuant to Babcock.
This argument, which invokes the Stoddard-Quirk notions about literature and distribution, would seem to push that case one step further. As presently devised, StoddardQuirk distinguishes, for the most part, between working and non-working time areas.
Here access is entirely precluded. In cases pertaining to distribution alone the
proposition has been rejected inferentially. Cf. General Motors Corp., supra note
264. Armco Steel Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. No. 126, 57 L.R.R.M. 1132 (1964); cf.
Getreu v. Armco Steel Corp., 56 L.R.R.M. 2501 (S.D. Ohio 1964).
292. J. I. Case v.NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
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representatives.... The workman is free if he values his own bargaining
position more than that of the group, to vote against representation; but
the majority rules, and if it collectivizes the employment bargain, individual
advantages or favors will generally in practice go in as a contribution of
3
the collective result.29

To 1. I. Case, the retort of Gale Products must be that minority
solicitation rights are inextricably tied to the representation process
and that the majority's overwhelming power requires sensitivity to
employees who would not otherwise possess meaningful organi-

zational techniques. In many instances this may be the case. But
it should be understood that the broad sweep of J. I. Case is antithetical to Gale Products insofar as the former case propounds almost
complete dominance of collective bargaining over that of the minority
group or the individual.29 More specifically, 1. I. Case stands for the
proposition that advantages for individuals must be specifically pro-

vided for in the collective bargaining agreement. Few (though some)
unions would sign an agreement which would place them in such an
unfavorable competitive position. The more probable course of action
would be a contract which specifically contemplates the minority
union and one which states that the prohibition must apply to all
or that such rights are subject to joint consultation between the union
and the employer. 2 5
293. Id. at 338, 339.
294. See General Indus. Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 712 (1954), wherein the Board applied,
to some extent, the J. I. Case approach to a solicitation case. In General Industries
the contractual prohibition could have been interpreted as applicable to only MESA
Local 18, the contracting union. As written, it covered working time but, in fact, the
contract was enforced in regard to unregulated break periods. The Board found that
the UAW adherents were lawfully discharged for soliciting on company time and
that the respondent had not interfered with their rights during non-working time.
More important, however, was the Board's disposal of the complaints insofar as it
dealt with Respondent's warning against the wearing of UAW badges, activity protected
during both working and non-working time. In this regard, the Board said that
"Uniform application of the no-solicitation contract provision required that Respondent
accord MESA no greater privileges, even as incumbent bargaining representative, that
it allowed the UAW." 110 N.L.R.B. at 726. Thus the Board assumed that MESA
could bargain away the otherwise protected minority right to wear insignia during
working time so long as the contract was not discriminatorily enforced. Cf. NLRB v.
Monarch Tool Co., 210 F.2d 183 (6th Cir. 1954).
295. See article XXII of the contract in Wah Chang Corp., 124 N.L.R.B. 1170 (1959),
rev'd on other grounds, 305 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1962), which stated the following:
"There shall be no soliciting or petitioning in the plants without the consent of the
Company and the Union." Cf. Art. IV, § 5 of the contract in Ford -Motor Co.
(Sterling Plant, Chassis Parts Division), 131 N.L.R.B. 1462 (1961), which stated
the following: "The right of the Company to make-such reasonable rules and regulations, not in conflict with this agreement, as it may from time to time deem best for
the purpose of maintaining order, safety, and/or effective operation of the Company's
plants, and after advance notice thereof to the Union and the employees, to require
compliance therewith by employees, is recognized. The Union reserves .the right to
question the reasonableness of- the Company's rules or regulations through the
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Gale Products then reaches in where the contract is silent and
gives an advantage to the minority. But one can more easily appreciate the principle articulated by focusing attention on a few hypothetical cases. Are, for instance, a minority of employees, disenchanted
with union leadership, able to conduct solicitation campaigns in a
manner similar to members of other unions? The answer is that
neither Gale Products nor previous law appear to contemplate this
type of protection. 96 Thus the decision will assist employees in
ridding themselves of the incumbent union but will not permit them
to work within the framework in a more moderate, peaceable fashion.
Will the incumbent union be precluded from solicitation when antiunion petitions supporting no other union are circulated by employees?
The answer must be yes. For here the dissatisfaction is with the union.
Probably, moreover, preferential treatment for all parties except
the incumbent union will extend to outsiders such as the mayor and
local businessmen and, of course, it must extend to the employer
himself. The illogic in Steelworkers teaches us that employer's
rights are to be on a plateau beyond those of the employees or
anyone else. Now Gale Products cannot view these above mentioned
possibilities with much alarm. Indeed, that case, in order to disadvantage the incumbent with such a grand sweep, must see the
industrial community in terms of powerful unions possessing bargaining and economic power that means inpregnability to rival or
minority action. This is part of the truth, but only part. Let us try
to categorize to the extent that it is possible, a few bargaining
relationships and analyze the impact of Gale Productsin each case.
The first category is the relatively stable collective bargaining
relationship where the union is secure and potential unfair labor
practices and grievances of average individuals may be settled in
an amicable fashion by the company and the union-often over the
head of the workers. The automobile industry might be a good
example. This is the situation where Gale Products has the greatest
validity. Notwithstanding the craft rumblings of a few years back,
minority union solicitation would not be terribly harm-iful to the
incumbent. Not only does the incumbent enjoy a secure position
but it is also fundamental that union power here is a great potential
for abuse against the individual. And here, paradoxically, the Lincoln
grievance procedure." In Wah Chang the Board interpreted the rule as unlawfully
giving the Union veto power over other employees. In Ford Motor Co. the question
of union veto through exclusive utilization of the grievance procedure was not reached.
Cf. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
296. A close case might be presented by the so-called "rebel" movement to oust
an incumbent union. Cf. Cushman Motor Delivery Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 146 (1963), redd,
327 F.2d 396 (7th Cir. 1963).
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Mills2 7 quid pro quo of which the Gale Products dissenters speak

has a greater relation to actual fact.
One's hesitations become nagging doubts, however, when we look
at the second category. Here the union has a fair amount of strengthaccountable, perhaps, to the funds of an international union which
does not restrict itself to one industry-but is not able to obtain a
union shop provision in the contract. Thus, there will be constant
efforts to extend organization to those who remain non-members.
Moreover, there may often be counter efforts on the part of dissidents
and those opposed to unionism generally. The United Aircraft case
adumbrates the importance, perhaps the special importance, that the
courts may give to such a union's organizational effort.2 9 But in
our hypothetical case, the union gives up this right. Here there are
disadvantages not only to the incumbent but also to the orderly
existence of the plant community. Also, tensions can be severely
exacerbated where the union and its members find their hands tied in
an election campaign. Will the incumbent be likely to have a fair
chance of gaining or even retaining members? The cruel irony is
that, even accepting the dissenters' rather doubtful proposition that
the union has received a quid pro quo, most certainly it was not for
minority union activity (excluding for the moment other types).
If the incumbent survives the contract in the face of heavy bombardment, one can well imagine the difficulties in discussing this provision
again. Once the union understands the clause's legal impact, its
members may find no quid pro quo acceptable (and of course may
be most unwilling to give up something else for recognition of that
question). So much for the future of the collective bargaining.
It may be argued that probabilities favor relatively few problems
in the above situation. That, however, is not the case with our third
category where the union is economically weak (perhaps in a newly
organized plant) and where the dissenters' quid pro quo concept is,
more often than not, a mythical concept. Mythical, that is to say,
unless the quid pro quo be viewed simply as the opportunity to
have a union contract. In these circumstances Gale Products may
297. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The quid pro quo
here is most likely to be union bulletin board privileges.
298. NLRB v. United Aircraft, supra note 126, at 131. It has been suggested that
the grievance procedure be used as the exclusive machinery to treat solicitation problems. This argument may have some validity, at a certain point, where handbilling
about plant conditions is concerned. But it is not quite clear how the Board could
effectively decide which activity is subject to which process. Organizational activity
qua organizational is not appropriate to the grievance process. But there will be
instances where the activity might partake of both elements-grievance and organizational. Cf. Laub Baking, supra note 183; Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 139

N.L.R.B. 849 (1962).
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serve as a convenient weapon for the employer who wishes to rid
himself of the union. The union cannot take a strike and survive.
The employer offers a contract with, among other restrictions, a pro-

hibition of solicitation. Indeed, to satisfy the dissenters' ideas about
collective bargaining, we could even assume that several benefits,

through which the union can convince the membership that there
is some improvement from the old order, are made contingent upon
acceptance of the clause. The union will be hard put to resist. If and

when the clause is accepted the employer, under Gale Products, can
begin his own campaign with impunity. The same can be done by

employees.

One wonders if the decision's authors contemplated

these consequences.

The last possibility is, theoretically, the one case where Gale
Productsmight be useful. Practically speaking, however, little would

be accomplished. This is the case where management deals with
its own creation-the company dominated union. Obviously here

the company wants as little trouble as possible and could quite easily
stop solicitation. Minority union activity is to be welcomed. But the
other practical problem is that the company's strength is great and
if it is able to create a union for its needs, one should safely assume
that a uniform application of the contract for all employees will

take place.
It then becomes obvious that these diverse bargaining relation-

ships would require the Board to examine each case carefully to see
whether or in what manner to apply Gale Products. This the Board
cannot and should not do. Thus the concurring opinion of Member

fenkins in General Motors Corp.2 9 would seem to be the better (or

299. Supra, note 264. The Gale Products dissent argues, of course, for the antithesis
of member Jenkins' position-prohibition for all parties. This too may be a better
viewpoint than that of the majority. But the dissent's analogy to the legality of the
more basic strike waiver is misleading. The strike is more basically disruptive insofar
as the entire bargaining relationship and the enterprise is concerned. Therefore
measures in the nature of emergency procedures may be tolerated. Furthermore, unlike
the strike weapon, solicitation rights will be exercised on a more continuous day to
day basis. The analogy, moreover, overlooks the important qualification of the strike
waiver which is its legal ineffectiveness when an employer commits a major unfair
labor practice. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Cf. Arlan's
Dep't Store, 133 N.L.R.B. 802 (1961). The dissent does not appear to contemplate
exceptions to solicitation prohibitions. The Seventh Circuit's reversal in NLRB v. Gale
Products, 57 L.R.R.M. 2164, 2165 (7th Cir. 1964), is a slightly less ambitious position
than that advanced by the Board dissenters: "The contract provisions here assailed
did not strip the employees of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Act. The provisions
preclude only a convenient-albeit a most effective-way of their exercise. Employees
are free to forego their qualified rights to on-the-premises organizational activities
in favor of the available alternatives thereto. The 'desirability' of collective bargaining
contract provisions from the standpoint of either the employees or the employer is not
the measure of their validity. Moreover, the arrangement here involved is conducive
to the stabilization of labor relations and thus in harmony with a prime objective of the
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perhaps it is more mathematically accurate to say best) view in this
area. Solicitation rights are too closely related .to the act's essence,
the spread of collective bargaining, to permit a legally effective waiver.
Surely this is the teaching of the Republic holding to the effect that
illegal anti-union motives are not necessary to a violation when an
employer unduly prohibits such conduct. This kind of per se violation can be found only when the conduct in question is so intimately
related to the "encouragement or discouragement" of union membership as to make proof of discrimination superfluous2 99a The contract
provision should be considered a nullity by the Board. The alternatives, as I have attempted to demonstrate, are much too costly.
This is not to say that minority rights are to be left unguarded.
But the crucial word should be "minority" rather than "minority
union." Gale Products tries to encourage the potentially damaging
battle between unions and, at the same time, proportionately weakens
the inclination to resolve differences within the established union.
The effect is not proportionate alone, but, as has been pointed out
above, a failure to protect the solicitation rights of intra-union insurgents who are normally protected by the act.300 This will canalize
the dispute between unions and not within the existing structure.
The most telling criticism of Gale Products is that which alleges misplaced energy. Suffice it to say that there are many other more
profitable routes for the Board to take.3 1 Gale Products is not one of
them.
VI. CONCLUSION

This article makes no secret of the writer's disappointment with
the rationale advanced in many of the cases and the failure to appreciate the industrial realities about which Mr. Justice Goldberg has
Act." (Emphasis supplied.)

The Board cannot impose the substantive terms of a

private collective bargaining agreement. NLRB v. American National Insurance Co.,
343 U.S. 395 (1952). However, even the Seventh Circuit seems to concede the illegality

of contractual prohibition in regard to some "fundamental rights." An employer could
not obtain a collective "yellow dog" contract. Conversely, the union and employer
cannot negotiate a union security agreement of excessive breadth for contract bar
purposes. Paragon Products Corp., 134 N.L.R.B. 662 (1961). Query, would the
court have arrived at a different conclusion if the prohibition was so broad as to
encompass, for instance, all speech regarding union activity? All speech? Does the
visible presence of a quid pro quo-union bulletin board privileges in this case-enter
into the conclusion of law?
299a. Cf. Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17 (1954); but compare NLRB
v. Miranda Fuel Co., 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
300. General Aniline & Film Corp., supra note 271.
301. E.g., Miranda Fuel Company, Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), rev'd, 326
F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
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lectured his brethren most recently. 312 For instance, if there is any
one contribution which Steelworkers has made it would be that case's
uniform approach to the various forms of union activity. The Court
is correct in concluding inferentially that the differences are relatively
inconsequential. But now Stoddard-Quirkhas removed the little good
that had been done.303
The more important damage, however, has been brought about
by the attempt to link the right to reply to captive audiences with
the breadth of no-solicitation rules. That is, in itself, the beginnings
of the alternate channels of communication thinking in this area.
From there it has been an easy process to preclude the employee's
right to an effective forum at the place of work.
Labor and management deserve a deliverance from the morass
of law that has been handed down. More than anything else, the
law must have clarity and a practical appreciation for the parties'
needs. 314 This, judging by either of these two examples, it does not
have at present.
The Board could effectively eliminate Livingston Shirt and, at the
same time, skirt the above mentioned shoals set down in Steelworkers.
For Steelworkers deals with an unfair labor practice and not the
laboratory conditions which are necessary for the proper pre-election
atmosphere. It is within the Board's discretion to hold that a denial
of a union rebuttal will set the election aside but not constitute an
unfair practice. 3 5 Gimbel Bros., however, afforded the Board this
opportunity within the distribution context; but it was rejected. If
the Board will not upset an election when only an ad hoc ruling is
needed, a presumption would seem, in the captive audience case,
inconsistent and indeed completely contrary to Steelworkers. But
the representation process, despite its above mentioned shortcomings,
may be the most desirable context in which to deal with the captive
audience without considering the no-solicitation rule. Section 8(c)
is a barrier to unfair labor practices and not representation cases.
Reliance on the latter might pacify such courts as the Sixth Circuit
which has, in May and Woolworth, displayed much obsequiousness
302. Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 351 (1964).
303. One encouraging sign in this respect, however, is James Hotel, supra note 176,
wherein captive audience addresses were at least considered in terms of violating an
otherwise valid non-retail-no-solicitation rule. This did not involve union rebuttal as
in Bonwit Teller but simply an alleged violation of employee rights premised as such in
Republic.
304. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., supranote 298.
305. For instance, in Atkins Saw Div. Case No. 26 R.C. 2060 (June 9, 1964), an
election was set aside where managements authorization was required in order to
solicit. The request problem would seem to be bypassed; accord, Edmont, Inc., 139
N.L.R.B. 1528 (1962); Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., supra note 124.
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to that proviso. Certainly the Fourth Circuit, in NLRB v. Shirlington
Supermarkets Inc.3°6 has noted the distinction favorably.
Similar problems arising where unions already represent the employees might be more profitably handled in section 8(a) (5) pro30 7
ceedings involving the refusal to bargain.
Conversely, it would be proper in cases like Steelworkers and
Gimbel Bros. (which was both an unfair labor practice and a representation proceeding) to find an 8(a) (1) violation without setting
aside the election. It would be desirable to order a new election
where employer action is close to the eve of the election and the
results are truly affected by such last minute intervention. Where
the employer's campaign is more drawn out, a request for equal
opportunity, not normally required where only employee rights are
concerned, might be required by the Board. This procedure would
discourage a union, hopelessly out of contention, from abusing
Board processes by sitting back, losing heavily, and then obtaining
a new election. While employer solicitation or distribution in this
context is 8(a) (1) conduct, uncritical utilization of Board election
machinery would be unwarranted and inequitable.
Republic sets forth a rule which, in either the 8(a) (1) or representation proceedings, has real application. If management is interested in production it will not disrupt it. To the extent that it does,
the Board is entitled to fashion remedies for what is presumptively
unlawful, with this disinterest in mind. This does not mean that one
should fall prey to the iron clad inflexible rules which Judge Hand
warned against in Bonwit. All that should remain, for the most part,
is Republic's presumptive discrimination and the importance of the
place of work as a forum.
The remedies that the Board can devise could take several shapes.
For instance, the Peerless Plywood twenty-four hour prohibition of
pre-election speech is much too short in dealing with the problem
that the Board sets out to solve. Why not extend the period to one
week? Is that not a more accurate reflection of time necessary to
rebut a sophisticated employer argument? Surely it cannot be done
so effectively in twenty-four hours. This proposal need not prohibit
speech in toto-as Peerless Plywood does-but simply could require
union rebuttals to any employer speech within that period. Perhaps,
within that framework, the employer should not be required to accede
to a union request before the one week period. Instead, the union
306. 224 F.2d 649, 652, 653, (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 914 (1955).
307. Cf. General Elec. Co. No. 2-CA-7581, Intermediate Report of Trial Examiner,
April 1, 1963. 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (Supp. I, 1959): "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for an employer . .. to refuse to bargain collectively with the
representatives of his employees....
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and/or the employees would have the right to distribute literature
during a portion (perhaps regulated) of working time so as to answer
company arguments. The union could be given a statutory right to
have its literature posted on the plant bulletin board. Here the
union would not be harmed so severely as by an election eve speech
which goes without answer. The employer, on the other hand, would
not have the large disruption of production that an oral rebuttal
might entail, but rather a continuous, more orderly union campaign
of distribution. Finally PeerlessPlywood's exclusion of literature from
that rule's coverage should be rescinded. Incidentally, this type of
solution would have some merit in the Gale Products context. The
Board could compromise the incumbent union's disadvantage by
permitting all unions to campaign during a designated period preceding the election. 3 8 This could be done also in the case of intraunion campaigns.
Another proposal would be to give the union the right to the
employer's mailing list of employees when the employer mails out
propaganda. 3 9 Landrum-Griffin requires that the incumbent union
officers give the opposition such lists.310 This regard for equality
should have some applicability in the present context. Of course it
should be recognized that this proposal is of limited value. Clearly
union access to mailing lists is not adequate to deal with captive
audience addresses.
It has also been suggested that, in the captive audience case, an
employer be permitted to overcome a presumption of illegality
through evidence that non-employee organizers had previously been
allowed to solicit on company premises. 31' This is a very sensible
approach which the Board, at times, seems to follow. 312 In fact,
308. A period before the expiration of the contract-considerably longer than that
envisaged for a reply to the captive audience-might be appropriate as a compromise
between employee free choice and the stability derived from the contract bar's
prohibition of Board representation elections. Cf. Montgomery Ward & Co., 143
N.L.R.B. 587 (1963); General Cable Corp., 139 N.L.R.B. 1123 (1962). The preexpiration solicitation period should properly precede the period in which competing
unions may file representation petitions. See Leonard Wholesale Meats, 136 N.L.R.B.
1000 (1962); Deluxe Metal Furniture Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 995 (1958). This is because such unions would need time in which to campaign for the necessary "showing
of interest," an administrative determination of employee interest in the union which
is a prerequisite to further representation proceedings. See NLRB, RULES & REGULA-TONs § 102-63 (1962).
• 309. Excelsior Underwear Inc., Case No. 11-RC-1876 (1964); K. L. Kellog & Sons,
Case No. 21-RC-9855 (1964).
310. 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C. § 401(c) (Supp. I, 1959).
311. Burke, Employer Free Speech, 26 FORDHAM L. Rv. 266, at 290.
312. Cf. Rath Packing Co., 115 N.L.R.B. 302 (1956); KFSD-TV, 111 N.L.R.B. 566
(1954). See also Johnston Lawn Mower Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 1955 (1954).
313. But see note 143 supra.
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Livingston Shirt might be read to contemplate the solution. 313 Hesitancies spring, however, from the wisdom or lawfulness of requiring
the employer to do, for purposes of future evidence, what he may
not be required to do under the Court's holding in Babcock.
Once again, we ought to remember that there are varying standards of proof requisite to an unfair labor practice charge and to
that involved in setting aside a representation election.3 14 A statutory
violation is not necessary to a finding that the election was not conducted in laboratory conditions.315 Thus the Board should feel free,
in a proper case, to order a new election-even outside the captive
audience case-where 8(a) (1) standards are not met. This is an
aspect that is often overlooked by many. The Board, where doubtful
that the courts will give an understanding review of a case, might
be wise in restricting the issues to the election and the atmosphere
surrounding it. The important limitation here is the ease with which
unscrupulous employers can flout this type of Board process. And,
as mentioned above, in unfair labor practice cases, Republic should
be the guide.
Those who answer proposals to deal with the imbalance that is
present in most organizational campaigns, by declaring that the act
316
does not guarantee success, are simply not talking to the problem.
Of course the act does not guarantee success. But it does provide
the framework within which to effectively facilitate the goal of
employee self-organization. This is the problem with which the Board
must grapple.
May dramatizes the importance of company premises as the center
of organizational activity for all parties. The problem goes even
beyond the protected response to employer campaigning. The Court
could not make a more significant gesture in this crucial area of labor
law than that of overruling Babcock and Steelworkers. The traditional concepts upon which these cases depend and the manifold
ambiguities contained therein, both make it alarmingly necessary
for the Court to write on a fresh slate. Nothing is to be gained by
delay.
314. McCulloch Corp., supra note 142.
315. Increased reliance on the representation process also obviates the mechanical
utilization of equal opportunity rules where unions are already the collective bargaining
representative. Cf. Anchor Rowe Mills, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. 1120 (1949).
316. Hanley, supra note 209, at 301, 307.

